

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General

Report of Inspection

Embassy Abuja and
Consulate General
Lagos, Nigeria

Report Number ISP-I-08-25A, July 2008

~~IMPORTANT NOTICE~~

~~This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, or any agency or organization receiving a copy directly from the Office of Inspector General. No secondary distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, by them or by other agencies or organizations, without prior authorization by the Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be determined by the Inspector General under the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE INSPECTION

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections, as issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

PURPOSE

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

METHODOLOGY

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated, reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.



United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

Office of Inspector General

PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, the Arms Control and Disarmament Amendments Act of 1987, and the Department of State and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, FY 1996. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its oversight responsibility with respect to the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors to identify and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to the OIG, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H.W. Geisel".

Harold W. Geisel
Acting Inspector General

Address correspondence to: U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Washington, D.C. 20522-0308

TABLE OF CONTENTS

KEY JUDGMENTS	1
CONTEXT	3
EXECUTIVE DIRECTION	7
Rightsizing	9
Facilities	11
Entry-Level Officers and Mentoring	14
Morale	16
Foreign Assistance Coordination	17
POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION.....	19
Political and Economic Sections.....	19
Staffing and Global Repositioning	19
Reporting	21
Communications among Washington and Mission Elements.....	22
Transformational Diplomacy	22
Support for Counterterrorism Efforts	27
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY	29
Press Section Activities	31
Cultural and Exchange Programs	31
CONSULAR SERVICES.....	37
Overview	37
Focus on Fraud	37
Consular Management.....	40
Consular Space.....	42
American Citizens Services.....	45
Nonimmigrant Visas	46
Immigrant Visas.....	47

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT	49
General Services	50
Human Resources	60
Financial Management	66
Information Management and Information Security	67
Quality of Life	72
MANAGEMENT CONTROLS	75
FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS	79
INFORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS	83
PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS	91
ABBREVIATIONS	93

KEY JUDGMENTS

- Mission leadership in Nigeria aims to craft a strong team and nurture collaboration and amity between Abuja and Lagos. Interagency coordination for implementing programs is effective. All agencies in Nigeria participated in the mission's strategic planning exercise.
- After a supercharged first three months, the executive office still has the good will and commitment of the country team, but there are stresses. The Ambassador must use the next few months to strengthen a two-way flow of ideas, information, and concerns in order to ensure full buy in on priorities by everyone at the mission.
- Foreign assistance funding for Nigeria is heavily weighted toward the President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) at 87 percent of the total. The likelihood of even more PEPFAR funding is engendering pressures for staff growth in several agencies. The mission's administrative platform, however, cannot support large increases.
- The Ambassador is exercising her authority judiciously in reviewing requests for new positions with an eye to ensuring the fiscal and human resources to support them. This scrutiny will engender tough questions that need to be asked about the mission's ability to absorb yet more program funds without parallel expansion of its operational budget.
- Despite a robust package of incentives, staffing Lagos and Abuja is hard, with many officers in stretch assignments, working out-of-cone, on excursion tours, or on directed first assignments. These staffing woes, an operating budget that lags behind program funding, and aging facilities in Lagos reduce the efficiency of diplomatic operations.
- Both the consulate office building (COB) and many U.S.-owned residences in Lagos have suffered physical neglect, based partly on the view that operations in Lagos would get smaller when the Embassy moved to Abuja in 2000. This shrinkage is unlikely to happen. To support staff morale, the FY 2009 timetable for renovations and physical security upgrades at the COB and housing units must not be allowed to slip.

- The chancery annex to be built in Abuja will not provide adequate work space for the number of employees slated to work in it. The Department of State (Department) should amend the project design to increase available work space. It appears that the Embassy's efforts to find a new, affordable warehouse in Abuja have succeeded.
- Consular operations in Nigeria are atypical and difficult to manage, coordinate, and staff. Sophisticated patterns of fraud have an impact on protecting visa and passport integrity. Nonetheless, processes are essentially sound, management controls appear effective, and consular leadership is tackling some of the persistent problems systematically
- The downsized public affairs section (PAS) in Lagos continues to target major public diplomacy audiences — the media, universities, business and cultural elites — and requires close coordination and support from PAS in Abuja.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between December 26, 2007 and February 1, 2008; in Abuja, Nigeria between February 2 and 12 and between February 26 and March 18; and in Lagos, Nigeria between February 13 and 27, 2008. ^{(b) (6)}

(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)
(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)
(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)(b) (6)

CONTEXT

Nigeria is among the most important strategic partners the United States has in Africa. It is a leader on the continent in peacekeeping and conflict resolution, with a large contingent of troops under African Union auspices in Sudan and a promise



to commit more to Somalia. Nigeria is also an economic powerhouse with the second largest economy in Africa. It hosts the Economic Commission for West African States, or ECOWAS, is the largest U.S. trading partner in Africa, and a major supplier of U.S. crude oil imports. Nigeria is home to Africa's largest Muslim population, nearly 70 million people concentrated largely in the North of the country. The Nigerian immigrant community in the United States numbers more than a million, so that people-to-people exchanges are vibrant and consular work is significant.

The United States has a strategic interest in ensuring a stable, democratic, and prosperous Nigeria, with a free-market economy, functioning state institutions, and effective delivery of social services to the population. With a population of more than 140 million people and one of the highest population growths in the world, however, Nigeria's economic, health, and social statistics highlight the grave challenges the country faces. Its oil revenues, while accounting for 80 percent of government revenue, are modest. As much as five percent of Nigeria's export output is regularly stolen and sold on the black market, and sabotage of oil installations is common. Corruption is rampant, and the recent federal and state elections are under legal scrutiny. Education is inadequate; the adult literacy rate has dropped from 90 percent in 1960 to about 56 percent now, and illiteracy is far higher in the Muslim North than elsewhere. The child mortality rate is alarming with 20 percent of children dying by age five; and the overall state of health care is inadequate, including action to stem the tide of HIV/AIDS.

Government neglect is provoking disaffection that, if left unchecked, could lead to the growth of insurgency or even terrorism. Increased desertification in the North and a growing population mean increased competition for already scant land and water resources. In the South, where unemployment among youths is widespread, vandalism against infrastructure such as pipelines is almost a way of life. Newly armed groups of youths readily join in the sabotage activities and kidnappings, upping the stakes for control of the energy resources of this area. Nigeria is also haunted by ethnic and political conflicts that have erupted in violence on multiple occasions in recent years.

Despite all these issues, Nigeria is crucial as a U.S. partner and regional leader. The United States looks to Nigeria for help in meeting the challenges of peacekeeping, promoting security in Africa, and participating in the war on terrorism. At the same time, Nigeria has been a steadfast foe of the emergence of the Unified Combatant Command for Africa — U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, and American efforts to locate its headquarters on the continent. The United States also works with Nigerians to help reform and energize their economy, strengthen their democratic institutions and practices, and improve their delivery of education and health care.

To accomplish all of this, the U.S. Government has a robust presence in Nigeria. Its annual overall program budget exceeds half a billion dollars, administered by multiple U.S. Government agencies. The Embassy shifted from Lagos to the new federal capital at Abuja in 2000 and now numbers more than 120 Americans and 320 locally employed (LE) staff. The consulate general in Lagos remains a large operation with nearly 70 American personnel and 280 LE staff. Despite the transfer of the capital to Abuja, the immense and sprawling city of Lagos remains the center for consular, commercial, and law enforcement work due to the continued location there of important government agencies, the city's huge population, the presence of oil industry principals, and the concentration of trade and investment opportunities. Collaboration between Abuja and Lagos is an executive office priority that will need constant high-level attention.

Operating in Nigeria presents many challenges that hamper staffing. Despite a robust package of incentives, staffing of both the posts has been difficult, with many officers on first tours, in stretch assignments, working out-of-cone, or on excursion tours. The Department's inability to fill many positions with experienced officers reduces the efficiency of diplomatic operations in Nigeria. There are no foolproof solutions to addressing staffing shortfalls, but at a minimum the Department should offer officers serving in Nigeria a reasonable quality of life. In Abuja, recreational facilities are few and expensive, crime is high, and opportunities for excursions out-

side the city are limited. Conditions in Lagos are, if anything, worse than noted in previous inspections. Traffic is dense and dangerous, public utilities do not function well, city infrastructure is dilapidated, and personal safety and security are the focus of continual anxiety. Providing administrative support services in the face of these difficulties is taxing and a source of both frustration and fragile morale; however, service providers are committed to delivering the best support they can.

The inspection comes at a time when embassy leadership has changed entirely, with a new Ambassador, deputy chief of mission (DCM), and principal officer in Lagos. This provides the opportunity for a forward-looking approach — working together to tackle the challenges and craft constructive solutions for the U.S. presence in Nigeria.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

The inspection of Embassy Abuja came at an excellent moment in the development of the mission as it coincided with the initial months of a new executive team in both Abuja and Lagos. This clean sweep followed a lengthy period of transitional temporary duty personnel at the helm in both places, the total turnover of the office support staff in both front offices, and difficult personnel changes in Lagos that had an impact on community morale. The energy and focus that have accompanied this new team's arrival are palpable throughout the mission. Several high profile activities, most notably the visit of Nigeria's new president to the White House, the American cultural activities in Abuja and Lagos to celebrate U.S. independence, and the drafting of the Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) framed the mission's response to front office calls for cooperation, communication, and coordination.

All three officers bring to their positions in Nigeria solid Washington know-how and strong program direction skills. The Ambassador also has a deep knowledge of Africa and is public diplomacy savvy. Both the DCM and the consul general bring long experience in consular management. All of these officers have been overseas in complex interagency environments. These attributes will hold them in good stead as they put their trademark on the work of one of the largest and most significant missions in Africa. To do so, the leadership is committed to the concept of forging a strong countrywide team.

It is too early for a full assessment of the success of this commitment, and there have been stresses in the staff's efforts to respond to the close scrutiny and multi-tasking from the front office. Nonetheless, mission leadership continues to enjoy the positive attitude and good will of the country team. They benefit from frank lines of communication with all agencies and sections and will want to ensure that the two-way flow of information and views that is in place continues. They also understand the need to eradicate any dissension between Abuja and Lagos that might be the legacy of an earlier "us versus them" dichotomy. This effort to mend inner fences is a work in progress that will require constant vigilance and good will.

Soon after her arrival, the Ambassador marshaled the efforts of a mission-wide program activities working group to prepare a comprehensive interagency inventory of U.S. bilateral programs in Nigeria. Her vision in seeking such a labor-intensive document was on the mark. The resulting matrix is enormously useful. It provides at a glance the immensity of the U.S. engagement in Nigeria and also highlights

synergies between the various Government agencies working in Nigeria in related fields. The Ambassador used this information to document for the Nigerian President, both in preparation for his meetings in Washington and as follow-up, the depth and breadth of the U.S.-Nigeria relationship. It is also clear that the Ambassador has rapidly made the information laid out by the working group her own, so that as she chairs weekly country team meetings, she is able to probe each agency about its programs, ensure discussion of relevant policy implications of these programs, and encourage interagency coordination in their implementation. This comprehensive program-centered initiative has strengthened the disciplined interagency approach in both Abuja and Lagos. It also played effectively into the development of the MSP that occurred during the inspection and fully engaged the same cast of characters across all agencies.

The executive office has been very active on outreach, with ambassadorial travel to many parts of Nigeria. This travel has included the sensitive Niger Delta that has been restricted for some time because of the dangerous security situation there. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) team heard from those in Washington who follow Nigeria that with the change of administration in Nigeria after last year's elections the ability of both the embassy and the consulate in Lagos to get to know decision makers at both the federal and state levels was essential. The new team has worked hard to meet this requirement and shows every sign of being committed to continuing to do so. In the process, it has precipitated a review of the travel restrictions in place in Nigeria for official personnel and the resources that would be needed to support an expanded outreach.

No function is more important for the leadership of the U.S. mission in Nigeria than focusing Washington's attention on the urgency with which an infusion of resources is needed to put the operations in both Abuja and Lagos on a solid footing. For too long, and despite a robust package of incentives, the Department's ability to fully staff these posts with experienced officers has been an unmet challenge. For too long, the financial resources to maintain existing Government-owned residential and office properties have been inadequate. These two resource issues are linked, and the new leadership has seized upon this dual imperative. As an example, the Ambassador has personally tackled one of the Embassy's most pressing needs with energy — getting a new maintenance workshop and warehouse in Abuja in the face of sky-high real estate costs. Whatever the facilities issues — and they are many — they impact on quality of life for the staff in both cities. Shortfalls for staff training, awards, vehicle and residential maintenance, and hard in-country travel are other factors that make assignments difficult in Nigeria. The executive team has lost no

time in familiarizing itself with the full range of resource issues they face and crafting plans to meet them head on. Only a sustained effort, however, following this strong start will bring the Department on board.

The consul general in Lagos is exerting a quiet but determined effort to address morale questions in the consulate. If anything, the work and living conditions in Lagos are worse than noted in previous inspection reports. The strain of providing support services in the face of a dilapidated infrastructure, dense and dangerous traffic, an absence of reliable public utilities, and high crime are taxing, and a source of frustration and discontent. This challenge came into focus during the inspection when an armed group attacked the Marine detachment residential compound, fired numerous rounds during a robbery, and wounded one of the Marines and a LE staff guard. The consul general called a town meeting to review the incident and the responses to it, and listen to the community's concerns. In general, the approach the consul general has taken in addressing staff concerns on all fronts is fine. At the same time, she will need to be vigilant so that the renovations and physical security upgrades projected for FY 2009 for the COB and many residential units stay on track and residential maintenance improves. Any delay in implementing the upgrades or in improving the quality of services will risk further erosion of staff morale.

Mission leadership in Abuja and Lagos supports Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) for its personnel. The OIG team also saw in action their leadership in ensuring security for the facilities and staff.

RIGHTSIZING

The Ambassador is doing a good job of following National Security Decision Directive-38¹ (NSDD-38) guidelines that require that all administrative issues be considered before making a decision to approve staffing increases. Since her arrival in December 2007, the Ambassador has denied two NSDD-38 requests for additional non-Department positions. The Ambassador then declared a moratorium on all pending NSDD-38 decisions unless and until the Embassy's management capacities, including staffing and office space, are sufficient to support further growth. The OIG team concurs with this approach.

¹National Security Decision Directive-38, Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and Their Constituent Posts, issued on June 2, 1982, assigns ambassadors the authority and responsibility to determine the appropriate size, composition, and mandate of all staffing operating under their authority.

Since 2005, mission staffing has increased by a total of 27 direct-hire positions, of which 25 are other agency positions. The FY 2010 MSP requests four additional Department positions: an information systems officer and deputy regional security officer (RSO) for Abuja and an assistant RSO and assistant facilities manager for Lagos. The OIG team concurs that these positions should be established and filled.

Given the likely increase in program funding for the health sector, some additional positions for other agencies may be needed, but the Embassy should do a better job documenting and justifying all staffing increases. The mission may need to ask tough questions about its ability to absorb increased program funds. The NSDD-38 files the OIG team reviewed included limited or no analysis about the effect of staffing increases on the management section. Files should include analysis weighing the cost versus benefit of staffing increases. NSDD-38 guidelines stipulate that all administrative support, security, office and residential space, and training cost issues should be included and considered in the decision making process. This analysis is especially important in Nigeria given the lack of secure office space, the uneven quality of maintenance, and the difficulty attracting qualified candidates to fill positions.

Recommendation 1: Embassy Abuja should follow National Security Decision Directive-38 guidelines to perform and document a comprehensive analysis of both programmatic and administrative requirements, including administrative support, security, office and residential space, and training cost issues prior to deciding on requests to increase personnel. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Consolidation of Duplicative Administrative Platforms

Department Tier 2 guidance states that posts where the Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) will be colocated on a new embassy compound (NEC) in FYs 2008, 2009, or 2010 should develop implementation plans to consolidate administrative services, beginning in FY 2008. The aim is to provide those consolidated services at the beginning of the fiscal year immediately following the move onto the new embassy compound.

OBO estimates that USAID's new office annex will be completed in October 2008. Mission personnel believe this date is unrealistic, and the OIG team concurs. Based on actual construction progress made, mission personnel project that the annex will be completed in FY 2009 or 2010. Full administrative consolidation cannot be achieved until the office annex is completed.

Because the annex completion date is almost certainly going to slip, so too will the momentum to move beyond the planning stage to consolidation of any administrative services. This includes administrative services that are not dependent upon colocation. The OIG team, however, pointed out the value of the mission continuing to develop and fine tune its consolidation plans. For example, joint working groups could be formed to develop single processes, services and standards for a single administrative platform.

FACILITIES

Mission leadership has taken a hard look at the facilities issues at Embassy Abuja to include the work space in Abuja and both the work and living space in Lagos. They were right to do so as both offices are grappling with either inadequate or substandard facilities that need immediate and serious attention and resources. The huge influx of funds from PEPFAR has led to hefty staff increases and demands for ever more space.

In Abuja, U.S. Government offices under chief of mission authority are located in five distinct facilities spread throughout the city. Efforts are under way to consolidate some of these facilities, with the aim of housing both the Department and USAID operations on the embassy compound, and collocating the operations of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Institutes of Health, and the Department of Defense (DOD) Walter Reed Program in one leased location elsewhere. The Ambassador and the Embassy's management team have worked hard to relinquish the lease at the embassy's current warehouse facility and relocate it elsewhere. Their efforts appear to be headed toward success.

- Virtually all the Department offices, as well as the offices of the Defense attaché and defense cooperation are housed in the chancery, which was first occupied in 2005. When the building was built, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) project included leaving the third of five floors unfinished, to be completed in a second phase of construction. OBO is currently supervising the last phase of work that will bring this third floor into full use. Completion of this work is slated for the first half of 2008, soon after the inspection ends. Bringing this additional floor space into use will help alleviate the crowding that exists for some Department operations — the general services office, the community liaison office (CLO), and some information management (IM) offices. The Embassy has drawn up detailed plans for occupying the new space when it comes on line.

- USAID occupies a maze of buildings in a residential area some 15 minutes away from the chancery. These buildings previously housed the chancery. The property is covered by five separate leases. At least one of the landlords is pressuring USAID to vacate the property as soon as possible. There is barely enough room for all USAID staff to have adequate work space, and the physical condition of most of the buildings is poor. Some minor construction is under way to maximize available space. USAID anticipates moving to an annex on the embassy compound, but the timing of that move is up in the air. Delays with the contractor have pushed back the likely date of completion of this annex, for which the contractors are just about to break ground. As important as the delay in the future occupancy of this annex is, the fact is that as designed it is too small to house the number of personnel USAID projects to have in its workforce by the end of 2008. This has been the subject of repeated discussions between the embassy and OBO, but so far without success. As a fall back, the Ambassador is engaged with USAID colleagues to craft short and long term solutions that provide adequate work space for USAID once the annex is built and the move takes place. The OIG team concurs that finding a solution to this issue is a top priority for the mission.

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Abuja, should amend the design of the chancery annex to accommodate the staff growth that has occurred since the current design was approved. (OBO, in coordination with Embassy Abuja)

- The CDC and National Institute of Health teams occupy one floor of a leased commercial building about 10 minutes from the chancery. This facility does not provide adequate work space for CDC's rapidly growing staff, projected at more than 80 by the end of 2008. The U.S. Government has now leased two additional floors in a linked building that, when refitted, will accommodate both CDC staff growth and the 30 or so employees of the DOD Walter Reed Medical Research Program that is now housed elsewhere. This will bring two of the main U.S. Government agencies working on PEPFAR into close proximity. There had been some hope that USAID's health team, another PEPFAR partner, would also find work space here, but CDC and DOD staff growth has made that unlikely.

- The DOD’s Walter Reed personnel are currently housed in a leased property in a residential area of Abuja, again some 15 minutes away from the chancery. This office of some 30 employees will move soon to a leased facility that is colocated with the offices CDC occupies as outlined above.
- The embassy warehouse and maintenance shop, located across town from the Embassy and colocated with small separately managed warehouses for both USAID and CDC, are substandard in every way, meet few if any safety standards, are an embarrassment to the U.S. Government, and ought to be vacated immediately. Employees at the warehouse characterized their working conditions as a “state of emergency.” The Ambassador has rightly pegged remedial action with the warehouse as a key management priority. The OIG team concurs with both of these assessments and encouraged the Embassy and OBO to bring the search for an alternative to a rapid conclusion. As the inspection was ending, OBO and the Embassy were closing in on an acceptable lease for the new warehouse the Embassy had identified despite the steep costs. When finalized, this new leased facility should answer the embassy’s warehousing requirements and allow it to relinquish the existing warehouse expeditiously.

Recommendation 3: Embassy Abuja should identify a suitable facility that can accommodate both a warehouse and maintenance shop, using the services of both a local real estate broker and a Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations real estate specialist, and vacate the existing facility as a matter of urgency. (Embassy Abuja, in coordination with OBO)

- In Lagos, the consulate general operates out of four distinct facilities spread across all three downtown islands and the mainland. Major changes will occur for three of these facilities in the short term. Managing these changes is the paramount challenge consulate leadership faces.
- The COB on Victoria Island is Government-owned and once housed the Embassy. This building is slated for a major upgrade in FY 2009. The project is in the design phase at OBO. It aims to expand the seriously inadequate work space and waiting area for the consulate’s consular operations and to add space for the entire PAS now housed elsewhere. (b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2) Both PAS and consular staff worry about the amount of space

In addition to group meetings and social events, for example, the Ambassador insists that section heads and others planning representational or travel opportunities include entry-level personnel whenever possible. The mission took advantage of the federal elections in 2007 to involve many of the officers from outside the political section in election monitoring and reporting. The executive office, in collaboration with section heads, is exploring ways to have staff exchanges between Abuja and Lagos. The preparations for an American culture week in both cities and high-level visits fully engaged entry level-personnel.

The formal performance review process for ELOs varies from section to section and is not fully consistent between Abuja and Lagos. The aim of involving executive personnel in the rating and reviewing exercise for ELOs is to strengthen the oversight and mentoring of untenured employees during their initial assignments abroad and ensure their exposure to a broad segment of embassy activity and the experience and know how of senior level personnel. At missions with many untenured employees, such as Abuja and Lagos, with more than 40 such officers between them, it is essential to craft a review process that is equitable to all concerned and reasonable in terms of work load. In Lagos, where the supervisory layers are few, the consul general is the formally designated reviewing officer for all untenured officers and specialists, more than 20 in total. In Abuja, the DCM is designated as the reviewing officer for ELOs only in the consular and regional security offices, where supervisory layers are also few. This accords with normal practice worldwide and is the ideal target.

In other sections, where there is greater management depth, the rating and reviewing process for untenured officers occurs within the section. This is the case in the political, economic, financial management, and IM sections in Abuja. Mid-level officers rate their entry-level personnel, and senior managers below the level of the DCM provide the formal review of their performance. The process in these sections works well, but even here the DCM retains a responsibility to ensure quality control in the oversight, mentoring, and evaluating of ELOs. This duty is especially important where many mid-level supervisors are on excursion tours from the Civil Service or other agencies, or in stretch or out-of-cone positions, and do not bring with them the experience and knowledge of the Foreign Service that good mentoring requires.

MORALE

Morale among the staff and eligible family members (EFM) in Nigeria is average. This assessment ought not to be surprising given the difficulty of serving in both Abuja and Lagos. Critical to understanding how people evaluate their morale is whether or not an assignment to Nigeria was among their top choices when transferring. For those anxious to serve in Nigeria, there is plenty to keep them happy and satisfied. The work is both strategically important and interesting, the Nigerian welcome is cordial, and engagement with Nigerians is relatively easy. Interagency collaboration is strong. Schools for accompanying children are very well regarded. There are also significant financial incentives that make Nigeria an attractive assignment, and a substantial number of direct hires have extended their service beyond the initial two-year tour of duty.

These factors notwithstanding, both Lagos and Abuja have been historically hard-to-fill posts, and many assignees come to Nigeria reluctantly. The corridor reputation of service in Nigeria in Washington is often poor, and employees shared with the OIG team the continual negative reinforcement they heard whenever they told people they had been assigned to Nigeria. Once in country there are early hurdles to overcome. Support on arrival and the sponsorship system have been uneven. The newly energized CLO coordinators in both cities are setting this in order. Individuals and families often find themselves without transport as processing vehicles for entry into Nigeria can be lengthy. Access to motor pool vehicles is available, but costs are steep. Driving is an adventure, particularly in Lagos where traffic is dense and dangerous. Public utilities do not function well. Internet availability in homes is costly, not widespread, and unreliable. The infrastructure in Lagos is dilapidated, violent crime is a fact of life throughout the country, and identity fraud is a constant source of anxiety. Restrictions in place for travel beyond a short radius of the inner cities can limit both work and leisure travel. Security escorts, when required, are expensive.

There are no foolproof solutions for addressing these difficulties. It is likely that service in Nigeria will remain challenging for the foreseeable future. At a minimum, however, the Department should offer personnel serving in hardship posts such as Abuja and Lagos a reasonable quality of life. Everyone understands that the strain of providing support services in the face of all the difficulties outlined above is taxing. That said, uneven housing, some of it substandard, inept maintenance, and inadequate work space combine as the single most important source of frustration and low morale in the community. This is why the OIG team fully supports the energy and engagement of the executive office with OBO to bring on line its projects to

upgrade existing office facilities in Lagos: build an annex in Abuja with office space adequate for the mission's expanding programs; renovate U.S.-owned housing in Lagos; and replace the warehouse and maintenance workshop in Abuja. These projects are essential foundations for a happy and productive American workforce in Nigeria.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE COORDINATION

Mission Nigeria's leadership is exerting effective control of its foreign assistance activities. Its MSP established foreign assistance priorities strictly aligned with its four strategic policy pillars: Governing Justly, Transparently and Democratically; Investing in People (with emphasis on health and education); Peace and Security; and Enhancing Economic Growth and Trade. Mission leadership uses its MSP pillars as a framework for the workings of the mission. It has an effective, flexible scheme of interagency working committees and meetings to coordinate these thematic approaches, with the most structured committee having a PEPFAR subcommittee to address the mission's most costly pillar — Investing in People. USAID's program team structure echoes mission themes, and communications are good. New mission leadership is reinforcing information sharing among mission agencies, starting with development of its mission-wide, comprehensive interagency inventory of bilateral programs.

With the exception of program officers, mission staff is effectively engaged in transformational assistance programs. The political-economic section manages well a modest Ambassador's Self-Help Fund and U.S. Democracy and Human Rights Fund and competes for grants from Washington offices in themes such as trafficking in persons and refugee assistance. PAS effectively provides media support for these activities, helping manage the implementing grants for other sections and participating in assistance coordination groups. It also carries out the Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation program, as well as a wide variety of projects described in the public diplomacy section.

Mission leadership is seeking a more balanced foreign assistance portfolio to address its strategic goals. Projected FY 2008 congressional budget justification levels developed through the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance's "F process" for these activities are only part of the money spent on each theme but illustrate relative U.S. Government resources directed to the issues. Peace and security funding levels were set at \$5.3 million, Governing Justly and Democratically levels at \$13.2 million; and Economic Growth levels at \$7.5 million. Funding for Investing in People was set at \$507.5 million, and of that \$467.5 million (87 percent of U.S. as-

sistance tracked by the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance for Nigeria) targets HIV/AIDS. Exceptionally high funding levels for HIV/AIDS create a clear imbalance in the embassy program mix and present a skewed picture of U.S. policy priorities. In addition, this level of HIV/AIDS funding has unintended consequences for Nigeria's broader health infrastructure, monopolizing the country's supplies of medical goods and services, including the qualified health professionals needed to meet Nigeria's other health needs.

The expansion of U.S. HIV/AIDS assistance efforts, as well as defense cooperation and other programs, is also sorely challenging Embassy Nigeria's administrative support platform. Decreasing budgets worldwide are cramping the ability of the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) to provide administrative support services, as well as office space the Bureau of Diplomatic Security can approve to house increased staff needed to expand assistance programs. The Ambassador has demonstrated strong leadership in limiting NSDD-38 approvals to ensure program staff expansion does not overwhelm the ability of the mission's support services. When these limited resources do reach their limits, however, Mission Nigeria's program agencies may need to explore ways to limit the growth of their programs due to inadequate available space and other support. Alternatively, those providing funds or program implementation may need to dedicate part of their program funds to administrative support services or office space approved by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. CDC already has its own management staff to support much of its work but still looks to the Department for many key services.

Program activities not covered by the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance's "F process" mentioned above include major U.S. Government assistance. Too much activity is not yet listed on "F process" inventories to allow them to be used fully successfully for mission assistance analysis. In Nigeria, for instance they do not capture DOD funding such as 1206 counterterrorism capacity building projects,² 1210 (formerly 1207) funding for reconstruction and stabilization projects,³ some forms of U.S. support for Nigerian peacekeeping forces, HIV/AIDS programs for the military, and various humanitarian operations. Federal Aviation Administration activities are not included. Using a more complete accounting process such as the process the Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia has developed would allow more effective Department monitoring.

²Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006.

³Section 1210 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007

POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SECTIONS

Executive Office Relations

The determination of the Ambassador to forge a close partnership with Nigeria has galvanized the mission. Her dynamism has resulted in closer cooperation between the political-economic section in Lagos and the political and economic sections in Abuja, because her activities outside the embassy, especially those involving extensive travel, require close coordination and meticulous staff work by the personnel of these sections. New clearance procedures and joint video conferences between Abuja and Lagos have rationalized information sharing, though initially at the cost of the timeliness of a cable or time that could be devoted to contact work or reporting. The DCM has been instrumental in communicating the Ambassador's priorities and seeing that they are realized in a coherent and rational way. The two section heads in Abuja have direct access to the Ambassador and the section head in Lagos to the consul general. Clear two-way communication among embassy and consulate leadership and the sections on mission priorities and political and economic realities will be crucial to reaching U.S. goals and maintaining morale.

STAFFING AND GLOBAL REPOSITIONING

Today, Mission Nigeria's political and economic sections in the Embassy in Abuja and its combined political-economic section in the consulate in Lagos are well-managed and fully staffed for the first time in years. The current section heads and their deputies are fully aware of their mentoring responsibilities. Although the disorganization, multiyear vacancies and months-long staffing gaps that characterized the recent past have been eliminated, section leadership must manage its work around maternity and paternity leaves for its staff.

Global repositioning brought three new positions to Abuja, though none to Lagos. Two of the new positions greatly strengthen the political and economic sections by adding an experienced mid-level officer to each one. (The third repositioning brought a talented Hausa-speaking ELO to the political section.) The economic sector now has an experienced deputy who can manage and train section personnel. The larger political section now has an experienced officer to back up the deputy section head who can help with the same tasks. Unfortunately, the head of the political-economic section in Lagos, with an equally inexperienced staff larger than the economic section in Abuja, has no one to help mentor or serve as an experienced deputy.

Nonetheless, proper staffing of these sections remains a long-term concern for the mission. Because attracting experienced mid-level officers to the mission is difficult, the small cadre of experienced officers in charge has to spend much of its time training the ELOs, out-of-cone officers, and Civil Service excursionists that make up the personnel of these sections. Mission Nigeria has become a training facility of questionable efficiency. The recent absence of the deputy head of the economic section on a three-month paternity leave illustrates the criticality of maintaining a full staffing pattern. As a result of this officer's long absence, the effectiveness of the economic section fell.

Many members of their sections also have had previous U.S. Government or private sector employment experiences that have helped them adjust quickly to their new jobs. It is important that missions review a candidate's personal qualifications to hold a portfolio rather than accepting just any in-cone, at-grade bidder for a position. An example of the right person in the right slot is the officer holding the energy portfolio (oil and gas) in Lagos. Though serving for the first time as a reporting officer in-cone, previous military service and nearly a decade working for a bank investing in oil and gas ventures make the this officer a good fit for the job.

The OIG team discussed with the relevant Lagos and Abuja section heads the merits of moving the officer in charge of the energy portfolio from Lagos to Abuja and upgrading the position. The major oil companies have recently established offices in Abuja to lobby the Government better, as the legislative and executive branches of the Nigerian Government have recently increased their interest in regulating oil and gas extraction. The Embassy in Abuja does not have anyone fully capable of handling this portfolio at this time. The location of the position in Lagos is probably appropriate for now. The incumbent should be ready to spend substantial time in Abuja with government contacts. Experience with the oil and gas industry is a crucial plus for any candidate for the position. However, the critical issue for the mission is to peg the position at the appropriate grade to help ensure recruitment of

COMMUNICATIONS AMONG WASHINGTON AND MISSION ELEMENTS

Communication among Washington and mission elements is good. Despite technical difficulties associated with the infrastructures of the mission and Nigeria, e-mails and telephone calls, as well as cables, keep bureaus and agencies in Washington informed. Communication and coordination between the sections in Abuja and Lagos have improved greatly since the arrival of new personnel and section heads during the summer of 2007. The sections now hold joint retreats three times a year. Internal communications are good, with weekly staff meetings including LE staff in Abuja and a twice-weekly meeting including LE staff in Lagos. The political and economic section heads meet with the DCM twice a week. These meetings sometimes include the Ambassador. The head of the political-economic section in Lagos confers frequently with the consulate general. Members of the sections, if not the section heads, attend various mission working groups. Officers with economic portfolios in Abuja and Lagos cooperate closely with the large U.S. Foreign and Commercial Service office in Lagos.

Each section is served by a first-tour office management specialist who has had extensive private sector experience. Two have previously worked in U.S. Government facilities overseas. The economic section in Abuja and the political-economic section in Lagos maintain electronic chronological and tag files of cables. The political section in Abuja has just begun to do so. Though there is a “face book” with pictures of top Nigerian politicians and officials, there is a backlog of biographic material to be processed electronically in Abuja. The political section hopes to clear the backlog this summer with the help of a summer intern.

Though the LE staff is located on a different floor, there is frequent and cordial contact between the officers and LE staff. Representational and travel budgets are said to be adequate, despite the necessity of paying for a police escort when traveling to certain areas of the country. Office space is adequate.

TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY

The Ambassador spearheads the mission’s renewed transformational diplomacy strategy. It has produced a Framework for Partnership, presented to President Yar’Adua in early February 2008, based on four pillars of cooperation: economic growth, governing justly and democratically, investing in people, and peace and security. Other U.S. Government agencies are executing assistance programs that underpin these areas of cooperation. However, the economic and political sections

in Abuja and Lagos provide an important role in providing policy guidance for these agencies, as well as engaging the Government of Nigeria in support of tax reform, promotion of free-market policies, and legislation on mineral exploitation.

The head of the Abuja economic section is particularly active in engaging top Nigerian Government officials and businessmen, though all section officers practice advocacy. Noteworthy are the outreach efforts of the energy officer in Lagos to persuade Nigerian officials to construct a coherent energy policy; the efforts of an officer in Lagos to combat trafficking in persons; and the activities of a political section officer in Abuja to reach out to Muslim communities in northern Nigeria. Some officers claim, however, that the requirement to clear any public statements in advance limits their effectiveness and even their credibility on occasion.

Nigerians are generally obliging and like Americans. Access is rarely a problem, though scheduling sometimes is difficult. Nigerians understand and appreciate the altruistic purposes of U.S. Government assistance programs but balance U.S. efforts against the internal workings of their society, with its long-standing traditions of corruption, privilege, and desire for immediate advantage. As well as assessing political and economic trends, mission reporting must assess where the partnership has succeeded, where it has failed, and suggest ways that will make it more effective.

Ambassador's Self-Help and U.S. Democracy and Human Rights Funds

An example of outreach and transformational diplomacy at its best is the Ambassador's Self-Help and U.S. Democracy and Human Rights Funds. Fueled by two grants of \$95,000 and administered by an energetic member of the political-economic section in Lagos, these funds generate exceptionally and exponentially positive outcomes for a minuscule investment. In FY 2007 the self-help fund supported nine local nongovernmental organization projects involving skill training or well drilling. The Democracy and Human Rights Funds supported three projects that involved human rights and legal assistance. The projects are highly visible at a local level and provide tangible, positive results. They benefit residents of rural areas for whom the United States remains an abstraction, providing up to several hundred thousand people with potable water. They also provide good media coverage opportunities. These projects expand mission contacts and understanding of diverse Nigerian regions. When the Self-Help Fund coordinator monitors the projects, the coordinator and accompanying personnel frequently go to areas most mission personnel do not normally visit. The participation of the Ambassador at project ceremonies is common. The projects are invariably well-received.

The present program focuses on the Niger Delta, which is why the program coordinator is currently located in Lagos. The new Ambassador wants to refocus this program on northern Nigeria. Consequently, the mission may wish to give some consideration to transferring this function to Abuja in the future, ideally when the present grants in southern Nigeria and the Delta region have been completed. The present coordinator, an EFM, is uniquely qualified for this position because of extensive volunteer and nongovernmental organization experience as well as managerial experience in the private sector. The incumbent gives every indication of being the right person to manage this program, whether it is located in Lagos or Abuja.

Environment, Science, Technology and Health Issues

The environment, science, technology, and health (ESTH) portfolio is a work in progress, as the officer handling this portfolio, a civil servant on an excursion tour, is doing ESTH work for the first time. The portfolio is held in the economic section in Abuja. The head of the economic section and the deputy head have both served ESTH tours. Both mentor the ESTH officer, who has not received any formal ESTH training. No one had held the portfolio for the first nine months of 2007.

The ESTH officer acts as the principal interface with the Department on issues relating to HIV/AIDS, avian flu, and polio and with the U.S. Government agencies that are carrying out programs in these areas. With the exception of health-related activities, in-country ESTH activities by other U.S. Government agencies are limited. The portfolio does not currently include any responsibility for administering or managing specific programs. Possibilities for increased cooperation with Department of Commerce's U.S. Foreign and Commercial Service, USAID, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture are being explored as the officer in question gains more experience in the ESTH portfolio.

Labor Issues

Labor matters constitute only 15 percent of the portfolio of the designated labor officer, who is located in the political section in Abuja. Despite a number of cities of over a million population (including the mega city of Lagos), 70 percent of Nigeria's population remains rural. The country's two national labor confederations, one white collar, the other blue collar, embrace only 10 percent of the working population. Yet these confederations are the strongest civil society advocates on a national level and played a crucial, though indirect, role in mobilizing public opinion following irregularities in the April 2007 elections. Outreach to them is part of the MSP.

As there are no programs to administer, contact with the Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and with the Bureau of International Labor Affairs in the Department of Labor is infrequent. Though global repositioning brought the current incumbent to Abuja, a further repositioning exercise was to have eliminated the position until the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor strongly protested and saved the position for another two years. The OIG team concurs with the Embassy and the bureau maintaining the position. A colleague in the political-economic section in Lagos follows labor issues there.

The Annual Labor Trends Report is no longer mandatory. The last one for Nigeria was written in 2004. The present labor officer plans to write one this year.

Law Enforcement and Narcotics Control Activities and Interagency Cooperation

The chief of the narcotics affairs section is located in Abuja and reports directly to the DCM and the Ambassador. He supervises an LE staff program manager and driver. He also chairs the monthly law enforcement working group, which includes the RSO and the consular sections, as well as the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) offices in Lagos.

The narcotics affairs section officer is a civil servant on an excursion tour with previous experience with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in the Department. It is his first experience, however, living overseas and working in an embassy. The officer arrived in the late summer of 2007. His initial transition to embassy procedures was difficult because of his inexperience. Narcotics affairs section officers are usually members of the political or economic sections at their posts. His transition might have been easier had he been assigned to one or the other. As it is, the DCM has taken him into hand. The OIG team discussed with section heads the merits of placing the officer in one of political or economic sections. On balance, however, the current arrangement works well enough to remain in place.

The officer is directly responsible for a \$1.2 million package which is supplying drug detection equipment at Nigeria's international airports and training Nigerian personnel in their use. The officer and his staff also facilitate the selection of candidates and logistics for other training programs funded through Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs regional funding. These include DEA and FBI training programs in the United States and Nigeria. Abuja also facilitates the attendance of 50 or more Nigerians annually at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Botswana. The office is also seeking to reinvigorate

the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Program and its Office of Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training projects, which Nigerian bureaucratic inefficiency and the lack of available U.S. personnel has slowed. The bureau also finances two Department of Treasury officials seconded to the Government of Nigeria in Abuja, but they do not report to the section officer. They operate quite independently of the embassy, and the OIG team was unable to contact them.

Law enforcement cooperation among mission elements is good. The regional security office and consular section cooperate well on identifying fraud and on American citizens services, sharing an assistant RSO investigator. DEA and FBI also report good information sharing with the consular section, which cooperates to deny visas to narcotics law violators and identify Nigerians of FBI interest or under its warrants. Mission travel restrictions do not hamper the work of the DEA or the FBI, who also report good relations with the regional security office.

Law enforcement cooperation with the Nigerian Government is haphazard at best. Although the mission receives cooperation on interdiction efforts and on unusual, high-profile incidents, it cannot rely on Nigerian law enforcement to provide consistent day-to-day cooperation on issues such as reliable host-country guards.

Refugee Affairs

The current regional refugee coordinator for West Africa is posted at the embassy in Accra, Ghana. This officer reports to the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration in Washington and has yet to make a trip to Nigeria but plans to do so in the spring of 2008. There are a few thousand refugees in southwestern Nigeria, mostly from nearby West African countries. Many have been in Nigeria for a decade or longer, making local integration their best long-term prospect. The last UN High Commissioner for Refugees camp for them closed in June, 2007.

The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration finances the Ambassador's Fund for Refugees for the relief of refugees in Nigeria, as it does for refugees elsewhere in the world. The fund provides Nigeria a modest \$20,000 annually. It is administered by the political-economic section in Lagos. In FY 2007, Ambassador's Fund funding went to a local nongovernmental organization to conduct skills training for a small number of refugees to increase their chances for more successful local integration. The officer administering the Ambassador's Fund notes that training in the issuing and monitoring of grants would have been useful.

Trafficking in Persons

In FY 2005, the Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP) provided \$18,000, which was distributed to local nongovernmental organizations to raise local awareness about trafficking in persons. The projects have long since been completed, but no final reports were sent. The post has not received any G/TIP funds since they have been channeled through the USAID office in Abuja. The PAS office in Lagos, which signed off on the grants, has asked for an accounting. The political-economic officer handling trafficking matters in Lagos has asked the grantees for final reports. This officer is also submitting project proposals to G/TIP in Washington.

SUPPORT FOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

Half Moslem, half Christian, Nigeria presents a delicate terrain for counterterrorism efforts. Small groups have claimed affiliation to al-Qaeda or describe themselves as Taliban. Communal frictions often take on religious overtones, but, except for a few instances, have not bred fanaticism or overt hostility to the United States. Government of Nigeria agencies concerned with religious terrorism share information with their embassy counterparts. The political section is restricted to advocacy.

As part of her transformational efforts, the Ambassador wants to engage Nigeria more actively in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and its components of counterterrorism, democratic governance, military assistance, and public diplomacy. Now that the spring 2007 elections have passed, there is less concern that mission advocacy for such initiatives may become a political football, and mission activity is increasing. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism related that counterterrorism reporting from all sections of the Embassy is both good and complete and praised the mission's support of a visit last year by a foreign emergency support team.

In September 2005, an antiterrorism bill before the Nigerian National Assembly was withdrawn because of concern about Moslem sensibilities. The bill was in part a response to UN Resolution No. 1373 of 2001, which called on member states to adopt antiterrorism measures. A similar bill may be introduced this year. While it is in U.S. Government interests to have such a bill passed, the mission understands that identification of the bill with U.S. Government lobbying would be self-defeating and has been working quietly on alternatives that would avoid this pitfall.

Mission Nigeria hopes to accelerate its offering of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Antiterrorism Assistance Program courses to Nigeria. Due to funding shortfalls related to the continuing resolution in 2007, it offered only two courses in fall 2007. The RSO runs the program and hopes to offer as many as five courses in 2008 in Nigeria or the United States. Its courses have been well accepted and have served as catalysts for Nigerians considering development of their own counterterrorism initiatives.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

In her short time in Nigeria, the Ambassador has demonstrated that she places a high priority on public diplomacy. Upon arrival she elevated the program profile of the mission's national day events. The event, held in Nigeria during the winter to ensure good weather, grew from a single event to a two-week long schedule of activities in Abuja and Lagos this year to inaugurate the Ambassador's tenure. With experience as Director of the Bureau of African Affairs' Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Congo, she has clear ideas on the content and execution of public diplomacy. She is comfortable in public and assured before the press, making her a valuable public diplomacy asset.

Mission Nigeria's PAS is well-managed and generally well-staffed, active, broad in its range of activities, and on target with MSP goals. The section is fully integrated into Mission Nigeria's programs and an active participant in policy development. The country public affairs officer (CPAO) in Abuja, the senior officer with budget authority, served last in Lagos as the public affairs officer (PAO). She is an enthusiastic student of Nigerian society and culture and provides good guidance to both posts. Her official travel and that of her section are extensive and productive. She is attentive to the morale of PAS staff throughout Nigeria.

The American officers in the PAS are a productive mixture of public diplomacy and nonpublic diplomacy cone officers. Several were attracted to Nigeria because it offers tandem assignments and/or management challenges that can enhance their professional advancement. The CPAO directly supervises out-of-cone information and cultural affairs officers on first public diplomacy tours. The CPAO also supervises a seasoned, one-country information resource officer (IRO) with African experience, who also has cultural affairs program duties. She has given a recently hired EFM an office management specialist position that can help organize and maintain PAS Nigeria's complex programs. The PAO Lagos is an FS-02 in a stretch position as an FS-01 officer but uses other overseas experiences and his private sector background to maximize his contributions. He supervises an energetic Civil Service excursionist, who brings considerable public diplomacy experience from former positions in USAID, the Department, and the U.S. Information Agency. Her high regard for cultural diplomacy and strategic strengthening of educational exchanges drive strong programs.

Nigeria's LE staff have strong language skills and professional backgrounds. They are energetic, experienced, active, and committed to their jobs. They receive appropriate training opportunities. PAS management in both cities respects the Department's standards for employee counseling and performance evaluations for LE staff, as well as American officers.

Nigeria receives adequate funding, which it pieces together from various Department program sources. The Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs considers Nigeria a high priority country and provides additional program opportunities for Muslim outreach to supplement PAS Nigeria's modest public diplomacy budget of \$2 million (this includes LE staff salaries of \$890,000). In addition, Abuja's IRO and Lagos' PAO have initiated private-public partnerships with U.S. and Nigerian companies and U.S. private foundations to substantially extend post program resources for specific programs. Continuing resolutions, however, leave little public diplomacy discretionary program funding for much of the fiscal year and makes program management difficult. The CPAO in Abuja and the PAO in Lagos are satisfied with their internal division of representational, travel, and program funds.

Embassy Abuja's section and the smaller Consulate General Lagos' section both have nationally important public diplomacy roles to play, a rationale for PAS Abuja supporting the smaller section in Lagos. PAS Lagos' programs address major public diplomacy audiences that did not migrate to Abuja when the Nigerian Government and the U.S. embassy did but still reside in Lagos. These include most of Nigeria's major universities, leading national newspapers, business and commercial leaders, independent television networks' national headquarters, the arts community, and Lagos' 18 million people.

To promote cooperation, the PAS has regular off-site meetings, and the CPAO visits Lagos often for consultations, enhancing Lagos' outreach to her former contacts. PAS Abuja manages the consulate general and embassy's public Internet Web sites. It also takes the lead in producing Nigeria's English and Hausa language magazine, "Crossroads." PAS Abuja's expertise in information resource center (IRC) matters is also important, as well as it taking the lead in maintaining calendars of events and other administrative matters.

PRESS SECTION ACTIVITIES

The information sections in both Abuja and Lagos cooperate strategically and effectively to place the U.S. Government's message in Nigeria's media and carry out press programs. The OIG team was able to observe thoughtful discussion and planning among the executive office, the political and economic sections, and the PAS on the mission's media message and tactics. It also saw considerable coordination between the two offices on coverage of and relations with the important national media in Lagos. A Hausa-speaking local employee in Abuja monitors the Hausa language press in the predominantly Muslim North.

Colleagues in both posts praised their PAOs for their cooperation on program support, including press coverage of Washington visitors. Lagos has begun to score significant MSP-targeted television placements in the Lagos-based national television networks — a first. PAS Nigeria also is seeking to squeeze maximum advantage from its Nigerian exchange grantees in the United States by arranging for them to file reports via the Internet or other inexpensive audio links for use by Nigerian broadcasters.

Cooperation between the two posts on press programs include the development of major public-private partnerships in Lagos to support specialized media training in election and health reporting benefited both section's journalist audiences. These nationwide programs resulted in concrete change in Nigeria's media reporting.

CULTURAL AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

Mission Nigeria cultural and exchange program is comprehensive, active, and balanced among MSP goals. PAS Nigeria carries out Department-managed musical programs and exhibitions, as well originates its own projects. A demanding two-year project to build Nigeria's capacity to preserve Muslim manuscripts in the north through the Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation becomes even more of a major undertaking in a nation where host-country partner institutions and their program cooperation are exceptionally weak. Dealing with institutionally limited Nigerian partners, as well as poor roads and communications infrastructure, adds labor-intensive overhead to all that PAS Nigeria does, making its outreach achievements even more impressive. Its thematic programs such as Black History Month have a particular resonance to Nigerians. PAS' work on the Ambassador's complex multi-agency national cultural weeks in both Abuja and Lagos won kudos. The staff understands the need to target audiences in their languages and has requested and expects in the

near future a Hausa language designated position to program Northern Nigeria's Muslim population and complement its "Crossroads" magazine distribution. The addition of this position had been identified as a priority in the Department's global repositioning exercise but was postponed at the last moment.

PAS Nigeria manages the mission's International Visitors Leadership Program projects strategically to maximize their value and makes the program available to all mission agencies. Washington audiences report high-quality Nigerian candidates who arrive well briefed by the mission. Its FY 2007 voluntary visitor programs nurtured groups of high-level contacts capable of making changes in Nigeria such as vice chancellors of universities, leading law school administrators, and high-level Nigerian cultural officials.

The OIG team observed good reasons for Nigeria's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs-supported educational exchanges and citizens exchange programs enjoying a good reputation in Washington. PAS Lagos has made good strides in strengthening its Fulbright Program, taking increased advantage of the Foreign Language Teaching Assistants program, and finding Nigerian private sector funding for Fulbright scholarships. Nominations for other programs, such as the Summer Institutes for the Study of the United States are increasing. Both posts are working conscientiously to expand Nigerian participation in their alumni associations beyond Nigerian Fulbright returnees. Its citizens exchange programs contribute squarely to supporting MSP goals such as governing justly and investing in people.

Both posts continually maximize synergies among programs. For instance, the OIG team observed the dedication ceremony of the PAS Abuja IRC to Rosa Parks. In addition to the Ambassador, speakers included an Educational Advising Center student advisee, from the International Visitors Leadership Program, and an Abuja political-economic section nominee for The Secretary's International Women of Courage Award. PAS includes program alumni whenever possible in its programs to maximize the U.S. Government's investment in their contacts.

Educational Advising Centers

Both educational advising centers in Abuja and Lagos carry out innovative programs recognized within the Department as some of its best. Abuja has three educational advisors, Lagos two. Both offer extended counseling relationships with student clients on a fee-based system or through scholarships to the brightest students. The fees support their considerable outreach activities. Both centers also offer free conventional advising services. Their approach develops students with clearer educational goals and better access to U.S. scholarship programs. PAS Nigeria's

student advisees regularly win placements to prestigious U.S. universities through the support of the United States Achievers Program. The “Career Connect” internship placements in U.S. companies in Nigeria, which the Lagos center features, encourage Nigerian talent to remain in Nigeria. The development of education fairs around the U.S. alma maters of alumni returnees is an innovative approach that brings personal knowledge of U.S. education to Nigeria despite security and travel concerns that hamper the direct participation of U.S. universities. Relations between the consular sections and the educational advisory centers are good.

Both centers must deal with space issues. In Abuja during the fall when numbers of students seeking educational advising service skyrocket, the IRC’s mature audience of researchers is pressed uncomfortably close to the educational advising center’s student clients in a cramped chancery. Lagos’ space is ample at present; however, an anticipated move to new space in the COB will put it into equally limited space. This will require adjusting operations.

Information Resource Centers

Embassy Abuja’s IRC is an effective information operation despite its location within oddly shaped, difficult to use space. As noted above, the space it shares with the educational advisory center is at times jammed with young student advisees — an audience at odds with more mature researches taking advantage of the IRC. It offers Internet and other training to librarians and others contacts. It has an active outreach program and through close cooperation with the RSO has expedited the entrance of visitors through an innovative membership picture identification card.

The IRC in Lagos, however, needs attention to meet its potential. When the Embassy migrated to Abuja the library director retired, and its webmaster transferred from Lagos to Abuja. A research librarian and library clerk were left to staff the center in Lagos. This center is located in the public affairs complex in the former U.S. Information Service library space, which provides bright, ample space for open public access to a large collection of American periodicals and books. The Department no longer supports this information program approach, and the great majority of the books and periodicals now are embarrassingly out of date and serve little purpose but to make the bookshelves appear full. The uncertain timing of the move to new reduced space in an expanded COB, however, has made more difficult the adoption of a new, more appropriate program profile. Heightened security procedures and a librarian with outdated skills and little enthusiasm for change, resulted in reduced patronage and hampered launching a new program direction.

However, PAS Lagos must develop a strategy to update its program profile in its present space, minimizing expenditures for program directions that must be abandoned when the IRC moves to new, much reduced space planned for it. The need to choose a replacement for the IRC Lagos' research librarian, who is retiring in spring 2008, adds to the urgency of developing a comprehensive plan to restructure its programs. The OIG team discussed with PAS the merits of developing a library internship program for Nigerian university library science students and exploring the use of the Fulbright program to expand its outreach into the library community. In addition, the OIG team discussed the value of additional LE staff positions in the IRC to carry out research and for related American Corners and cultural affairs programs.

Lagos has requested a reorientation of mission resources to increase support for the IRC from the Abuja information resource officer. This one-country IRO is a hard-working information program professional with the expertise Lagos needs. Embassy Abuja has concentrated on the North and its high-priority Muslim population, directing the IRO's attention to that region and limiting his support for Lagos' IRC. This has left PAS Lagos without the technical attention that can move it in the right direction. Greater attention to Lagos' IRC will improve its operations and its American Corners support activities.

Recommendation 5: Embassy Abuja should rewrite the work requirements of the information resource officer in Abuja (#60104000) to indicate that he makes regular visits to the public affairs section in Lagos to review its Information Resource Center operations and provide continuing program and technical advice and consultations. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

American Corners

PAS Nigeria has 12 American Corners in Nigeria. PAS Abuja is responsible for seven, and PAS Lagos is responsible for oversight and support for five of these partnerships. The Nigerian host institutions for the American Corners appoint directors and other staff with widely different capabilities, affecting the quality of their programs and the cooperation they can offer the mission. In addition, Nigeria's American Corners have been under funded since they were established. Nevertheless, PAS Nigeria has made progress with its limited staff in strengthening its American Corners. It is time, however, to review near-term and mid-term strategies to reinforce this trend and to expand their utilization by other mission agencies. This approach calls for a temporary moratorium on adding American Corners. This parallels the

Department's desire to reevaluate the program and limit its expansion. The OIG team made an informal recommendation that Mission Nigeria follow a near-term to medium-term strategy of maintaining the present number of American Corners and strengthening the present capacities rather than adding American Corners to their program.

Military Information Support Team Relations

DOD's Military Information Support Team (MIST) and the PAS in Abuja have developed a collegial, mutually beneficial relationship in support of MSP goals and MIST's goal to contain militant ideology in the North. MIST teams have funded and worked closely on a major book donation program, "Peace Clubs" to promote religious tolerance in the North, and innovative projects such as a Hausa-language broadcast version of "West-Side Story" set within Nigeria's Christian-Muslim ethnic strife. PAS implementation expertise is essential to MIST's projects.

Public Diplomacy Grants Management

The public diplomacy sections in Abuja and Lagos do good jobs in their management of grants, which include public diplomacy, political-economic section, and MIST team grants. Funding sources for the grants include public diplomacy, Bureau of Populations, Refugees, and Migration, PEPFAR, and DOD accounts. The OIG team discussed procedures with both PAOs that could enhance the transparency of PAS grant documentation and processes.

CONSULAR SERVICES

OVERVIEW

The consulate general in Lagos has the largest consular operation in Africa, while the embassy in Abuja handles a modest nonimmigrant visa (NIV) and American citizens services (ACS) workload. Consular work in both posts is plagued by rampant and sophisticated fraud. Both sections are staffed almost exclusively with first-tour officers, several in stretch positions. The consular section in Abuja is modern and spacious, with unused desk and storage space, while the Lagos section is overcrowded and ill designed. The senior consular officer is in Lagos, the constituent post, rather than in the embassy. The Lagos consular district includes the majority of the resident American citizens and encompasses the most volatile and crime-prone states. In short, the consular operation in Nigeria is atypical and difficult to manage, coordinate, and staff. Despite these obstacles, processes are essentially sound, management controls appear effective, and consular leadership is tackling some of the persistent problems systematically.

FOCUS ON FRAUD

In calendar year 2007, the Lagos fraud prevention unit (FPU) investigated approximately 550 cases of suspected fraud. Four of the 13 citizenship cases referred to FPU, 88 of the 249 diversity visa cases, and nearly half of the 202 marriage investigations proved fraudulent. Although the Abuja consular section does not appear to experience the same level of fraud as Lagos, every management decision, every client interaction, and every public outreach initiative in both the embassy and the consulate general is colored by concern over fraud or a perception that the visa process might be vulnerable to inappropriate influence.

The Lagos FPU is staffed with four investigators, one analyst, a receptionist/clerk, and a data-entry clerk under the leadership of an ELO who rotates through the position every few months. (See consular management section below for a discussion of staffing issues.) Their work is complemented by a committed assistant RSO for investigations, who could easily devote 100 percent of his workday to fraud

prevention. (See the classified annex for a discussion of RSO staffing.) Despite this robust staffing, the volume of work, difficulties in securing motor pool services, budgetary limitations, and travel restrictions for the geographic areas with the most fraud have resulted in investigation backlogs that affect high priority adoption and fiancé cases and generate volumes of public inquiries. Because there was no FPU capability in Abuja prior to February 2008, the Lagos FPU has been investigating all of the fraud cases that originate in the Abuja consular section as well as those originating in Lagos.

During the inspection, an ELO arrived in Abuja to serve as that post's first part-time fraud prevention manager. With the anticipated addition of an LE fraud investigator, Abuja should be able to conduct most of the investigations it generates and assist Lagos with many if not all of the immigrant visa (IV), diversity visa, and ACS investigations originating in Lagos but requiring field work in the Abuja district. This will save government resources — time, expenses, and wear and tear on vehicles — and better serve the consular clients who sometimes wait up to a year before the Lagos FPU can travel to the Abuja district.

The OIG team discussed the need to train the new Abuja fraud prevention manager and the FPU investigator. The team proposed that the new investigator travel to Lagos to observe caseload management and investigations and also accompany a Lagos investigator on the next scheduled investigation trip in the north preparatory to assuming primary responsibility for the northern fraud investigation caseload.

Recommendation 6: Embassy Abuja should request Consulate General Lagos to return the Abuja fraud investigation cases still awaiting action and develop a six-month training plan that will enable Embassy Abuja to conduct fraud investigations on Consulate General Lagos' behalf in its consular district. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

The OIG team also made an informal recommendation that the embassy review the FPU workload distribution a year after Abuja's FPU assumes full responsibility for investigations in its consular district to determine if a Lagos FPU position needs to be transferred to Abuja.

The Lagos FPU investigates 100 percent of the adoption cases handled by its IV unit to ensure that the prospective adopted children meet the definition of orphan and are free to be adopted legally. About six percent of the adoption cases investigated in 2007 resulted in a determination that IVs could not be issued, often because

the final adoption order was not yet in force. Each Nigerian state has its own adoption regulations, and in many cases, once the adoptive parents are aware that more processing is required they are able to complete the process. Embassy Web site information on adoptions was nonexistent at the time of the inspection, although development of an updated site was well advanced, and prospective adoptive parents will have access to better information about the complexities of adoption in Nigeria and locale-specific legal requirements. The OIG team made an informal recommendation that the FPU analyst, in conjunction with the IV chief, review adoption cases held by the FPU, track and analyze results, and reevaluate the practice of referring all adoption cases for field investigation.

Officers do not accompany the FPU investigators on field trips. In a high fraud environment, there should be a mechanism to randomly accompany the LE investigators or regularly spot check their results. Workload pressures on the interviewing officers combined with the FPU practice of taking two- to three-week-long investigation trips are undoubtedly at the origin of the current situation, but consular management in Lagos needs to develop a mechanism to protect the integrity of the investigation process.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Abuja should instruct Consulate General Lagos to develop both a fraud prevention unit travel plan that includes officers in some of the field investigations and a mechanism for spot checking other investigation results, and Embassy Abuja should follow suit. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Consular management is focused on the fact that machine-readable visa funding from the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) for in-country fraud investigation travel will not be provided after FY 2008. In recent years, machine-readable visa funds have accounted for anywhere from \$50,000 to \$150,000 dollars per fiscal year for investigation travel. In addition to paying the FPU travel costs, machine-readable visa funds have also been used to cover the supplemental fees for police escorts, as required by the security situation in Nigeria. Normally CA expects the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to pay for security escorts in support of official travel, but in Nigeria the consular section has been footing this bill. With MRV funding drying up but fraud still widespread, consular management is working with the RSO and the embassy's budget office to determine what program or other funds are available or need to be requested from the Bureau of African Affairs to continue fraud prevention work in the coming fiscal years. This could be an issue that the Ambassador and DCM will have to address in priority setting exercises.

CONSULAR MANAGEMENT

The senior consular officer in Lagos has oversight over all consular operations in Nigeria but does not have supervisory authority over the consular section chief in Abuja. However, their relationship is productive and consultative, and Abuja normally tries to follow the same processes as Lagos. For example, Abuja agreed to take some steps during the inspection to bring their renewal process in line with that of Lagos. Because there is no supervisory relationship between Lagos and Abuja, the DCM necessarily plays a role in ensuring consistency in the consular process countrywide.

The Appointment System

Many of the processes set up in both Abuja and Lagos result from the effort to stem fraud and limit the manipulation of the consular process. The management of the appointment system is the most obvious example.

Both Lagos and Abuja make NIV appointments using CA's Web-based appointment system. Because, until recently, both posts had long wait times for appointments, Nigerian visa applicants and informal travel agents representing applicants have been booking multiple appointments by making slight changes in the applicant data to trick the system into thinking a new applicant is making the appointment. Applicants then appear for interview at their preferred time, while the "extra" appointment goes unused. For a combination of reasons appointment wait times were growing both in Abuja and Lagos, and up to 50 percent of the appointments on any given day were not showing up.

In an effort to stem the tide of double bookings, Lagos implemented a procedure to review appointments the afternoon before, highlight any double bookings, and turn away those applicants the following day when they appear for interview. In February 2008, no fewer than 40 persons were turned away every day. The message that double bookings result in no booking at all has not reached the public as consular management hoped it would. This means that, in addition to a large number of no-shows for other reasons, the consulate general is also turning away over 200 persons per week who actually try to present themselves for interview. Those applicants then rebook immediately, all contributing to pressure on the appointments in the coming days or weeks and the impression among the public that appointments are difficult to come by.

During the inspection, Abuja agreed to replace its parallel appointment system for visa renewals with the same system operating in Lagos and to institute visa pass back at an exterior window instead of bringing applicants through security simply to collect their passports. Recognizing that management created these processes in response to the high fraud environment, the OIG team counseled both Lagos and Abuja to avoid similar mechanisms without any clear advantage for the workload and to the detriment of the visa applicant.

Staffing

Recruiting experienced senior and midlevel managers in Lagos has been a perennial problem. Both the Abuja and Lagos consular sections have one experienced consular officer and a cadre of first-tour ELOs or Civil Service excursionists. In Lagos, the NIV chief is midway through her first excursion tour, and the incoming IV and FPU chiefs will be first-tour excursionists from outside the consular field. This situation puts incredible pressure for training, leadership, counseling, and day-to-day supervision on the consular section chief. In Lagos, that person has been covering the consular section chief and consular deputy jobs simultaneously for several months due to the unanticipated early departure of the former consular section chief. It is a tribute to the dedication and determination of both consular managers that the two consular operations, but busy Lagos in particular, are as productive and upbeat as they are. CA made a concerted effort to fill the Lagos consular section chief and deputy positions in the upcoming cycle, and it seems likely that CA will have to take similar pains when the Abuja consular section chief and Lagos mid-level managers are due to rotate if the two posts are to build on the recent momentum.

Few, if any, consular operations the size of Lagos have a deputy consular section chief who is not also the head of a processing unit. Even the mega-Manila consular section has a deputy who is also the IV chief. With two rest and recuperation trips per two-year tour and a growing IV workload, Lagos feels the pressure on its visa operations, but it devotes one full-time ELO to the ACS unit and one to the FPU. Both of these ELOs rotate every few months, which detracts from continuity and oversight of those two units. Because Lagos is expecting the arrival of a full-time FPU chief, as discussed above, it is logical that the incoming deputy consular section chief should also oversee the ACS unit. The ELOs currently serving full time in ACS and FPU could then reduce their hours in those units to half time and supplement the NIV and IV units that have processing backlogs.

Recommendation 8: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should rewrite the position description of the Lagos deputy consular section chief to include primary responsibility for the American citizens services unit. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with CA)

The Lagos consular section is authorized one consular assistant and three consular associate positions. CA funds the associate positions, but the consular assistant position is funded by the Bureau of African Affairs. Because consular associates require training and certification, it is unlikely that Lagos will ever be able to fill three consular associate positions at once. At present, the one prospective consular associate is awaiting a security clearance and occupying the consular assistant position in the interim, preventing the post from filling the assistant position even though it has selected a candidate. Because Lagos needs more than one assistant to capture NIV fingerprints, it would be more practical to have two consular associate positions and two consular assistants rather than the current authorization.

Recommendation 9: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of African Affairs, should eliminate one of the three consular associate positions at Consulate General Lagos and replace it with an additional consular assistant position, adjusting the funding source as appropriate. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with CA and AF)

CONSULAR SPACE

Abuja makes thoughtful use of its consular space and has room to grow with its workload. On the other hand, the Lagos consular section outgrew its facilities years ago and crams all but its FPU into a warren of small desks, punctuated by stacks of files lined up in the passageways. The entire section of over 50 staff prints on one printer because there is no space to position another printer anywhere. The cashier sits in an enclosed office the size of a confessional for nearly eight hours a day. The FPU is located two floors above the rest of the consular section. They have been conducting client interviews in their joint workroom, but the practice of bringing fraud suspects into the main part of the consulate general has been stopped, and referrals to the FPU will become more difficult to manage.

A planned reconstruction of parts of the consulate general will alleviate some pressure on the consular section and bring all of the elements into a common space but will not make the section into a state-of-the-art operation by any means. The reconstruction does not address the need for the sole consular cashier to serve customers in both the ACS and visa waiting rooms. The current situation, where ACS fee payers exit the building and reenter at another compound access control facility in order to pay their fees before returning to the original waiting room, is replicated in the reconstruction design. The addition of a second cashier teller window facing the proposed PAS entrance would mitigate the situation by permitting ACS fee payers to approach the cashier without entering the visa waiting room or passing through four security control points simply to pay a fee.

Recommendation 10: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Abuja and the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should amend the design of the Consulate General Lagos reconstruction project to include a second teller window and deal tray in the consular cashier's booth accessible from the public affairs section stairwell. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Abuja and CA)

Lagos has a very early version of a Q-matic system⁴ that does not permit multiple queues or produce tickets and has, in fact, never been installed for those reasons. The success of the redesign, including an outdoor covered staging area across the street from the consulate compound, depends on a Q-matic system that can easily produce numbers for both IV and NIV customers. The Q-matic should have display screens both in the outside staging area and in the combined visa waiting room. Lagos already deploys LE staff outside the hard line to confirm appointments and direct access; a Q-matic is an important step in reducing the number of LE staff outside the hard line at any one time and would also eliminate the use of disruptive loudspeakers in the large waiting room. Funding a sophisticated Q-matic should be a high priority for the consulate general.

⁴A Q-matic is a device that displays the numbers of clients in the waiting room in order that they are to be served. Various models have additional advanced features such as printing of numbers for the clients.

Recommendation 11: Embassy Abuja should consult with Consulate General Lagos and the Bureau of Consular Affairs about requirements and fund a Q-matic system that can be installed at the same time as the reconstruction project or, if funds are not available, prepare a request to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations for procurement and funding as part of the renovation project. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Outreach

Both Abuja and Lagos have been focused for so long on establishing or rebuilding viable processes, coping with staffing gaps, and addressing emergencies that they have unintentionally neglected outreach efforts that would, in fact, help them improve their actual processes. The OIG team received reports from various parts of the embassy and the consulate general about the perceived inflexibility of visa services, in particular. This perception stems primarily from the fact that the consular officers have little time to learn about the priorities and work of their colleagues or to host their foreign affairs colleagues from other sections and agencies to demonstrate the difficulties of processing visas in a high fraud environment.

If outreach to other mission elements is limited, so much more so is outreach to the public. The consular section in Lagos, in particular, has concrete plans for a series of informational meetings with other mission elements. Consular management also plans to initiate an “Ask the Consul” column in local newspapers and take advantage of public affairs opportunities to reach a broader public about the visa process. The new FPU fraud analyst intends to develop a periodic fraud digest, which would highlight incidences of fraud including those coming from NIV applicants of interest to other mission offices. Finally, the embassy Web site is woefully lacking in useful details that might better prepare visa applicants and American citizens about consular processing, local regulations, and the penalties for fraudulent claims to entitlement, although updates are imminent. The OIG team encouraged both consular managers to focus on consular outreach now that their sections are better trained and staffed.

AMERICAN CITIZENS SERVICES

Both the Embassy and the consulate general have modest ACS workloads. Most travelers to Nigeria come for business or are naturalized Americans of Nigerian origin visiting family; neither type of traveler usually relies on the consular sections for much assistance.

Passport adjudication is problematic, however, because it is common for Nigerian-American dual nationals in their early 20s to apply for new passports with only infant passports as citizenship evidence and an unclear chain of intervening identity documentation. These are ostensibly children born to former Nigerian students in the United States who have never traveled abroad as American citizens but are now seeking updated citizenship documentation as young adults. Unfortunately, not all these passport applicants are the people they say they are, and many cases are referred for field investigation. This makes passport renewals far more time consuming than at other posts with a similar workload.

Both consular managers admit that their warden systems are in disarray and require immediate attention. Neither section is sure if the registrations that were entered from the old card files are still accurate, and few old cases have associated e-mail addresses. Every time the posts activate a warden message, a significant portion of the e-mails are returned as undeliverable. Both posts realize that even some of the wardens have left Nigeria without informing the ACS units, and for years the wardens have not received lists of registrants for whom they are responsible.

Communications are difficult in Nigeria, civil unrest has occurred unpredictably, and air and road safety are causes for concern. The OIG team suggested ways that both Abuja and Lagos can reconstruct their warden systems, train the wardens, and involve the wardens in welfare and whereabouts work when it is difficult for officers to travel to remote areas on short notice. The Lagos RSO coordinates a very active overseas security advisory council that meets weekly and disseminates security information to its employees and their families. The council's activities do not reach the hundreds of dual nationals, American children of Nigerian parents, and other nonaffiliated citizens scattered throughout the country. Recognizing that the reinvigoration of the warden system is a high priority need, the consul general in Lagos intends to lend the prestige of her office to this effort. The OIG team recommended informally that the Embassy include the reconstituting of a functioning warden system in its most recent MSP and devote more of its representational and outreach efforts towards this goal.

There are approximately 50 abducted American citizen children currently in Nigeria, primarily in the Lagos consular district. Most are victims of custody disputes. The same travel restrictions and resource limitations that hamper fraud investigations also affect the attention the ACS unit can give to these child custody cases. Although the ACS officer may be fortunate enough to reach the custodial adult by telephone relatively quickly, few of these children are located close enough to Lagos to permit regular visits, and most are in remote or unsafe areas. If the consular section could form a nexus with wardens in those zones, with Nigerian Government officials, or with social service agencies, this would have a multiplier affect in managing these sensitive cases.

NONIMMIGRANT VISAS

Despite the problems with the appointment system mentioned earlier, and NIV units staffed almost exclusively by newly arrived ELOs, appointment wait times have fallen dramatically in both Lagos and Abuja in recent weeks. Neither post experiences the eight-hour interview days that many of the busiest NIV sections around the world endure. Every officer has the opportunity to learn multiple consular skills, and there are light interview days to permit administrative work and training. There are generous LE staff resources in both consular sections. In general, work flow is well thought out and efficient.

NIV operations would benefit, however, from more attention to training and from hands on instruction by the experienced consular managers when ELOs first arrive at post. Most NIV ELOs reported being trained in post specific procedures and interview techniques by only slightly more experienced ELOs. In Lagos, an ELO has created a nascent NIV training manual, but the OIG team discussed additional ways to familiarize new officers with the Nigerian context and with interview techniques. Both consular sections could cope with more interviews each day and have the flexibility to use administrative time for interviews when surge capacity is needed. In Abuja in particular, the consular section chief could assist with NIV interviewing or with ACS work regularly in order to increase capacity.

In both Abuja and Lagos, the OIG team discussed ways to increase efficiency such as returning passports from exterior windows to reduce the number of people coming through the compound access control, increasing the number of full validity visas, keeping notes in the consolidated consular data base to essentials, and focusing on targeted validation studies.

IMMIGRANT VISAS

Lagos is the sole IV processing post in Nigeria. It is making a concerted effort to whittle away at the backlog of close to 2,000 pending cases being held at the National Visa Center while still processing substantial numbers of diversity visa and fiancé cases. In addition to increasing the number of cases per day that the post requests from the National Visa Center, NIV officers regularly assist with IV interviews when their caseloads permit. As mentioned earlier, many diversity visa and marriage cases are referred to the FPU; interviews are time consuming, and follow-up correspondence, including complicated revocation memos, burdensome.

Approximately 80 percent of a day's IV cases result in temporary refusals based on expired or missing documentary evidence. This results in applicants returning to the section at least twice and sometimes more frequently before a visa can be issued even when there are no fraud indicators. The OIG team looked carefully at ways to increase productivity in the IV unit and made suggestions for reducing documentary refusals, staggering appointments, decreasing the number of times LE staff handle cases before applicants reach interview, evaluating the availability of police clearances, and increasing panel physician access. Consular management was enthused about moving in a new direction and began implementing some changes immediately.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Agency	U.S. Direct-Hire Staff	U.S. Local-Hire Staff	Foreign National Staff	Total Staff	Total Funding FY 2008
State – D&CP	69	5	43	117	\$5,833,800
State – ICASS	17	8	337	362	\$14,603,200
State – CA	11	0	13	24	\$1,387,758
State – Public Diplomacy	6	1	29	36	\$1,957,300
State – Diplomatic Security	6	1	10	17	\$2,796,995
State – Marine Security	14	0	8	22	\$302,200
State – Representation	0	0	0	0	\$66,800
State – OBO	3	0	5	8	\$300,000
INL	1	0	2	3	\$600,000
CDC	5	1	45	51	\$5,140,700
Foreign Agricultural Service	2	0	4	6	\$487,314
Foreign Commercial Service	2	0	11	13	\$520,578
DOD-HIV	3	0	7	10	\$2,815,088
DOD-Office of Defense Cooperation	17	0	2	19	\$787,000
DEA	4	0	2	6	\$116,952
Defense Attaché Office	6	0	3	9	\$524,126
Legal Attaché	3	0	4	7	N/A
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services-NIH	1	0	2	3	\$166,000
U.S. Department of Treasury	1	0	0	1	N/A
USAID	22	0	83	105	\$287,100,000
Totals	193	16	610	819	\$325,505,811

Living conditions in Nigeria have changed little since OIG teams conducted inspections in 1997 and 2002. Traffic is congested and dangerous, the infrastructure is dilapidated, and public utilities function irregularly. Short-term leased properties are expensive, constructed poorly, and require frequent repair. Goods procured locally are of an inferior quality and sometimes counterfeit. Access to rest and recreation is limited and expensive. Crime is also a major issue. Unescorted travel for U.S. personnel is restricted to two islands in Lagos city; in other areas they must travel with armed escorts. Personnel have been subjected to mob attacks and armed

robberies even in the “safe” zones. In fact, during the inspection, armed assailants robbed the Marine house and shot a marine and local security guard. It is reportedly not uncommon to see corpses in the street, and, in fact, a headless corpse was found floating in the lagoon close to the consulate general boat dock during the inspection. In Abuja, the living conditions are better, but safety is still a concern, and there is a sense of isolation due to a lack of amenities.

The strain of providing administrative services in this difficult environment taxes the management staff and is a source of frustration and low morale to the entire mission community. Customer surveys rate administrative services anywhere from good to poor depending upon the level of local engagement. Because both Abuja and Lagos have difficulty attracting qualified bidders and are historically hard to fill, some key staff members lack the requisite qualifications and experience for their positions. For example, management officers at both posts are serving out of their cones. Civil Service excursionists fill two other supervisory positions. Seven management staff occupy positions above their personal grade levels, and two ELOs fill mid-level positions.

Even with these challenges, both management teams are committed to providing the best possible support. The management teams have engaged the Bureau of African Affairs and OBO on time-consuming and costly facilities issues. As an earlier section of this report outlined, facilities issues include: in Abuja, an urgent, exhaustive search for a new warehouse and construction of a new office annex; and, in Lagos, the major rehabilitation of the consulate general, a Government-owned residential complex, and the consul general’s residence. The management teams are also focusing on significant rightsizing, financial management, human resources, and other general services issues. Resolving real property and staffing issues is critical to improving the condition, suitability, and corridor reputation of Mission Nigeria.

GENERAL SERVICES

The general services section provides a wide range of services in a difficult environment. Real property, housing, maintenance, and other issues are discussed in greater detail below. All general services office positions are currently filled.

Government-Owned Properties - Lagos

All Government-owned properties located in Lagos are in poor condition. According to staff, funding for maintenance and renovation has been inadequate.

(b) (2)(b) (2)

The U.S. Government purchased a number of residences during the 50 years when the Embassy was located in Lagos. (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) These units are scheduled for renovation in the near future, with plans for much-needed cosmetic upgrades to the exterior and enhancements to interior space and lighting. These units tend to be smaller than the existing short-term leased units, but they present relatively fewer maintenance problems because they were constructed to U.S. standards and are maintained by mission staff.

Consulate General Building

The consulate general building, constructed in 1979, is slated for a major rehabilitation scheduled to begin in FY 2008. This project includes security upgrades, expansion of the consular section, and new offices to which the PAS will be relocated from the former embassy compound. The compound was acquired in 1958 and has been identified for disposal once the consulate renovation is complete and PAS has moved.

Consul General Residence

The U.S. Government also owns an executive residence built in 1947, originally intended for the Ambassador but now designated as the consul general's residence. The house is currently undergoing interior renovation, and the consul general will be moving from leased quarters to the rehabilitated residence later this year. The house contains over 7,000 square feet of interior space and is located on a 5.2 acre waterfront lot. The house and yard contain sufficient representational space, and in fact much of this expansive and prime property is unused. (See housing section for a discussion of the potential use of this property.)

Housing

Housing is one of the primary determinants of post morale, but customers gave housing low scores on pre-inspection surveys for both Abuja and Lagos. Irrespective of the post, or whether or not the housing is leased or government owned, mission personnel view their housing negatively.

Management staff in Abuja and Lagos face similar challenges with leased housing. There is a shortage of quality leased housing in areas that are considered relatively desirable and safe. Landlords request and receive very high lease prices, ranging between \$50,000-100,000 per year, with at least two years payment in advance. In FY 2007, annual lease costs were \$5.4 million. Unlike other potential renters who have fewer administrative and financial limitations, the embassy and consulate general must ensure that potential rentals meet security and safety standards and then must obtain an OBO cost waiver because all new leases far exceed the maximum annual lease cost of \$25,000. The time required to complete these reviews means that the posts often lose the most desirable properties to other foreign entities and are left with less desirable properties for mission personnel.

Residential maintenance is another major challenge for management staff in both cities. The quality of most construction in Nigeria is well below U.S. standards, and even the most modern residential units experience chronic problems with basic systems such as plumbing and electricity. Despite contractual language requiring landlords to maintain the buildings, only a few demonstrate the ability and willingness to provide quality and timely repairs. The mission facilities maintenance staff is often called upon to inspect, correct, or perform maintenance for which landlords are responsible. Because the missions must pay lease costs two years in advance, if landlords do not meet their maintenance obligations, the missions do not have the leverage to withhold lease payments or to deduct from the rent the cost of repairs their maintenance staff perform.

Given all of these disadvantages of leasing properties in Nigeria, the Embassy should determine if building additional residential units would make more economic sense than leasing. Abuja is in the midst of a construction boom. Landlords want to do business with the mission and are willing to enter into build lease agreements. This is just one business method available. In Lagos, there is sufficient land available for the construction of multi-unit staff residences on the U.S. Government-owned consul general's residence property. Given the potential savings in lease and security costs, as well as the maintenance advantages of having more housing on a controlled access compound, this warrants further study and review.

Recommendation 12: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations should conduct an analysis to determine if it makes economic sense to build additional Government-owned residential units in Nigeria. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Abuja)

Facilities and Maintenance Unit

Both the Embassy and the consulate general maintenance sections received low scores on the OIG team questionnaires. Employees complained that work orders were not promptly completed or simply ignored. The OIG team confirmed that work orders take an unduly long time to process due to, as post management contended, a shortage of both labor and funding among other factors. Neither Abuja nor Lagos has sufficient staff to maintain and repair all Government-owned properties. As a result, repairs take a long time to complete, often requiring several visits and follow-up. In Abuja, the Embassy has grown significantly in the past few years without a commensurate increase of the facilities maintenance staff. The Lagos facilities maintenance section employees are not properly trained. In addition, the Lagos workers have been at the job longer and are sometimes reluctant to embrace new ideas or techniques.

Funding for the maintenance sections has remained unchanged since 2005 when Abuja moved into the NEC. Last year OBO provided \$300,000 in 7901 account funding for maintenance and repair for Abuja and Lagos to share, and final funding for this fiscal year is expected to be even less. Lagos received \$200,000 of this amount, but \$500,000 could be spent easily in Lagos alone. The limited funding for basic supplies, equipment, and materials has a serious impact on efficiency. Abuja spent \$100,000 alone from the 7901 account to purchase some of the more expensive safety, health, and environmental management requirements for the facilities shops.

Nigeria has a weak utility infrastructure; Abuja and Lagos have been operating on generator power around the clock. Not only does this practice shorten the lifecycle of the generators, but it is also costly given the rising prices of diesel fuel. Embassy management projects that about \$770,000 will be spent this fiscal year on diesel fuel for the NEC alone. The consulate management personnel are concerned that they are only allowed to purchase diesel month by month. Lagos does not have any reserve diesel should an emergency arise, because the Embassy does not have enough funds to purchase fuel beyond a one-month supply. When the annex in Abuja is fully functioning, the total outlay for diesel fuel will sharply increase. If funding is

not increased, the maintenance issues may worsen and become even more costly to the U.S. Government. Therefore, it is essential now for the post to prioritize its major mission-wide maintenance projects and seek Department approval and funding.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Abuja should prepare and forward to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations a mission-wide maintenance plan with financial justification for a funding increase in the 7901 and 7902 accounts. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

The facilities managers' primary responsibility is to maintain Government-owned properties. There is a significant difference in the difficulty of this task between the two posts. In Abuja, the NEC has relatively few maintenance problems. There are some minor leaks in the roof that have corroded the rebar and discolored the façade, but there has been no internal damage to the building. In addition, procurement of chemical additive for the water used in the chillers can be lengthy, because there is no local source.

In Lagos, however, the aging infrastructure of both the consulate and public affairs buildings is a serious problem. Both look dirty and old. The consulate air conditioning chillers are 20 years old and break down constantly. These two buildings suffer from constant unscheduled emergency repairs that draw the facilities managers' resources from establishing a preventive maintenance program to identify and correct problems before they become emergencies.

Inventory

The Abuja warehouse facility maintains separate inventories of appliances and furniture for Department and other agencies, which is one of the reasons the existing warehouse is overcrowded. The establishment of mission-wide appliance and furniture pools would not only reduce the requirement for storage, it would also offer several other advantages. Specifically, it would simplify inventory recordkeeping and procurement actions and ensure uniform quality and quantity of household furnishings. It would also avoid unnecessary effort and potential damage in moving furniture and appliances when occupancy of a residence passes from one agency to another. Warehousing is one of the areas that is slated to coincide with consolidation but could take place earlier.

Recommendation 14: Embassy Abuja should develop and implement appliance and furniture pools in order to minimize the need for warehouse space, as well as to achieve greater efficiency in managing inventories of nonexpendable U.S. Government property. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Procurement

Customers expressed dissatisfaction over the length of time to process procurement requests. The OIG team noted several instances when the procurement unit took a considerable amount of time to process procurement requests and did not meet ICASS standards for timeliness. Although requestors are concerned about how quickly procurement requests are processed, the customers are more concerned about how long it takes to receive goods and services.

The procurement staff contends that this is attributable to insufficient information about the request, the need to obtain multiple bid quotations, and delays in getting funding information from the financial management center, which contributes to the delays in receiving goods and services. All procurement staff has had formal training, but a customer service orientation is lacking.

Better communication would improve customer service and satisfaction with the procurement unit. Customers must receive timely and accurate information regarding anticipated delays, expected arrival times, or the date the request was processed. The section is not using WebPASS to its full potential. The general services officer said that data entry of receiving reports and other information is inconsistent, thereby negating the system's advantages. The OIG team made several informal recommendations addressing procurement issues.

Customs and Shipping

In Nigeria, the length of time it takes to receive personal vehicles, household effects, and other goods can range between three to seven months, negatively affecting staff morale. Reasons for such delays are often beyond the control of the mission. The entry point for goods is in Lagos, but shipping documents have to be sent to Abuja for approval. The Port of Lagos does not have the capacity or equipment to expedite large amounts of cargo. This is very frustrating for employees who are aware that their shipments have arrived but must wait months for customs clearance.

Internal inefficiencies are also problematic. Personality clashes and finger-pointing has led to strained relationships which hampers cooperation and communication. Mission management acknowledges that these issues must be resolved and is undertaking process mapping to streamline the entire function. They are also planning to build teamwork through exchanges of personnel, and one such exchange occurred during the inspection.

Safety, Health, and Environmental Management

Even before the eventual relocation to a more suitable compound, there are several measures that post management should undertake to improve the safety of warehouse operations in Abuja and Lagos. Several of the recommendations from the August 2007 safety, health, and environmental management visit can be implemented immediately, particularly those that do not require substantial funding or building modification. These include protective clothing, protective glasses, and safety shields for machinery. Other recommendations will require more time and funding, but the mission should establish a specific implementation plan for all these recommendations.

Recommendation 15: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should develop a timetable and list of resource requirements to implement all recommendations for Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos warehouses from the 2007 visit of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations safety, health, and environmental specialist. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with OBO)

Motor Pool Operations

As is the case with other elements of general services, motor pool operations in Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos are encountering increased demands for support, while handicapped by resource limitations and other obstacles. Without increased resources and other operational changes, the motor pool fleets of both posts will likely fall even further behind the growing demands for transportation support.

The motor pool staff at Embassy Abuja consists of 23 drivers, three mechanics, and a dispatcher, but there is evidence that more drivers are needed. While U.S. direct-hire staff has increased, the number of motor pool drivers has remained

unchanged for the past few years. Along with normal business use, the motor pool must also support home-to-office transportation for newcomers awaiting delivery of their personal vehicles, because public transportation is neither safe nor reliable. Drivers are working excessive overtime, thus increasing the potential for accidents, and important administrative actions such as weekly vehicle inspections are not being completed as required. The OIG team noted minor operational weaknesses and made informal recommendations to address them.

The motor pool fleet for Embassy Abuja consists primarily of sedans and vans and also includes several utility vehicles such as an ambulance, flatbed trucks, and tankers to deliver water and diesel fuel to residences. The vehicles in the motor pool support Department program, diplomatic security, and ICASS operations, while USAID, CDC, and other agencies operate their own separate fleets. Despite the large number of vehicles, there is evidence that additional vehicles are needed. Maintenance staff report that they must ride in open trucks because there are not enough passenger vehicles to take them on maintenance visits.

In Abuja and Lagos, the motor pool fleet consists mostly of General Motors products, but these American-made vehicles are not the most suitable for either post. Neither General Motors parts nor service are readily available locally, and embassy mechanics are neither trained nor capable of handling the complex maintenance on these vehicles. As a result many are currently out of service, which places greater demand on the remaining assets. Post management wants to convert the mission fleet to Toyota vehicles, because there are local dealers, parts, and maintenance available. This would also harmonize with the USAID fleet of Toyotas. The OIG team advised the general service offices in Abuja and Lagos to obtain the proper waivers and authorizations from the Department before converting its motor vehicle fleet to Toyota vehicles.

Another issue affecting both Abuja and Lagos is the disposal of official vehicles, including armored vehicles. Although both posts recognized this problem, they have not established an action plan to rectify the situation. There are four such vehicles in Abuja and about 10 in Lagos awaiting disposal. In Lagos, no disposal of vehicles has been carried out for several years, and the vehicles awaiting disposal are parked in public view at the U.S. Government workshop, presenting a very bad public image. The post is working with the Nigerian authorities to dispose of these vehicles, possibly through use in military target practice. The disposal of Government-owned property is a true challenge in Nigeria; it is unclear, however, if all methods of disposal have been explored. The OIG team made an informal recommendation on this issue.

HUMAN RESOURCES

Customers gave the mission’s human resources (HR) operations average satisfaction scores on both OIG and ICASS questionnaires. There is greater dissatisfaction with HR services in Lagos where employees believe they have not been well served ever since all HR operations moved from Lagos to Abuja in 2005. At the time of the inspection, post management was in the process of moving one HR technician back to Lagos to provide HR services on site. The OIG team endorses this decision but suggests that management explain carefully to all consulate personnel the responsibilities and limitations of this position.

Some pre-inspection questionnaires alleged that HR employees have been influencing LE staff hiring in favor of certain ethnic and tribal groups. An OIG team review of the recruitment and hiring process did not reveal any cases where qualified applicants had been excluded from consideration. All applications that meet the qualifications are forwarded to the prospective American supervisor. In fact, the HR LE staff keeps all applications, including those that do not meet the qualifications, longer than required in case the selecting officer chooses to review additional applications.

Although the inspection did not reveal any improprieties, the OIG team noted that job vacancies are advertised primarily on the mission’s Intranet and Internet Web sites. Job vacancies are advertised in newspapers only for highly skilled positions. Because personal Internet access is not widespread in Nigeria, this process could be limiting the pool of potential applicants for most positions to current employees and their relatives and friends. In the interest of providing equal opportunity, all vacancy announcements should target a wider audience through advertisements and outreach to professional organizations. The OIG team made an informal recommendation that recruitment and selection of LE staff put greater emphasis on diversity and that outreach efforts be documented.

American Staffing

	Entry-Level	Civil Service	Stretch	Entry Level	Unfilled	Out of
Post	Officers	Excursions	Positions	in Midlevel	Positions	Cone
Abuja	18	4	16	4	10	10
Lagos	28	3	21	5	13	13
Total	46	7	37	9	23	23

Despite a robust package of incentives and Nigeria's strategic importance to the United States, it is hard to find at-grade officers interested in serving in Nigeria. U.S. direct-hire staff is characterized by a disproportionate number of officers on their first tours, in stretch assignments one or two levels above grade, working out-of-cone, or on Civil Service excursion tours. Often, positions are simply left unfilled. The inability of Abuja and Lagos to attract interested and qualified bidders hurts diplomatic readiness. Officers filling entry-level positions, in stretch assignments, and on Civil Service excursions too often lack depth of knowledge in their functional areas. There are few mid-level managers to mentor the inexperienced officers. Senior staff spends a significant amount of time on resolving operational issues rather than on planning, policy, and coordination. Morale is frequently low, and there are complaints about poor administrative services and quality of life. The inevitable backlog of work sometimes overwhelms new officers. These issues are not exclusive to Abuja and Lagos but are common to hardship posts.

Unfortunately, there are no clear solutions or recommendations for addressing staffing shortages at hardship posts. Possible solutions include more directed assignments, enhanced incentives, improved training, proactive leadership involvement in recruiting, and additional study and focus on resolving global staffing problems. At a minimum, the Department has to improve facilities and the quality of life for personnel serving in Nigeria, or recruitment woes are unlikely to improve.

The tour of duty at Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos is two years (with two authorized rest and recuperation trips). The hardship differential is 30 percent in Abuja and 25 percent in Lagos. Both posts are historically difficult to staff and are 15 percent service needs differential posts. Twelve employees are currently participating in the service needs differential program. The cost of living allowance is 42 percent in Abuja and 50 percent in Lagos. Abuja receives a \$2,500 consumables allowance. A separate maintenance allowance is authorized for EFMs who choose not to accompany the employee.

Personnel assigned to Nigeria do not clearly understand the reasons why allowances differ between the two posts. To the extent possible within Department regulations, equity in allowances for the two posts would have a positive impact on morale. The hardship differentials report for Lagos was sent to the Department in December 2007.

Position Descriptions

The OIG team found a number of anomalies in LE staff position descriptions between the embassy and the consulate general. Some Abuja positions are higher graded than Lagos positions with similar responsibilities and vice versa. For example, the radio technician in Abuja is higher graded than the radio technician in Lagos, but it appears that the radio technician in Lagos has even more responsibilities than his counterpart in Abuja. Similar examples exist with other position descriptions in the general services, consular, and public affairs sections.

According to 3 FAH-2 H-441, American supervisors are responsible for ensuring that positions under their direction are accurately described. 3 FAH-2 H-443 charges the supervisor with responsibility for keeping position descriptions up to date, and the personnel officer, or other American official responsible for the personnel function, with responsibility for ensuring that the classifications of LE staff positions are kept current. The personnel officer is also responsible for requesting amendments to position descriptions whenever there is reason to believe existing descriptions are inaccurate and with administering an annual review of all positions in each organizational unit. It is apparent that the embassy has not conducted annual reviews, and some managers have not taken the accuracy of position descriptions seriously, allowing staff to be paid for duties they are not actually performing.

Recommendation 16: Embassy Abuja should conduct a mission-wide review of all position descriptions, revise those that are not accurate, and reclassify the affected positions under the computer assisted job evaluation process. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Computer Aided Job Evaluation

The implementation of the computer aided job evaluation (CAJE) at Mission Nigeria has been problematic. It appears that, in spite of town hall meetings, training sessions, and management notices, former American supervisors erroneously told their employees that CAJE would result in grade increases; consequently, expectations were high. The LE staff committee raised the lack of transparency in the CAJE process with the OIG team. Some employees who had their positions downgraded appealed and were reinstated at the previous grade. The OIG team found, however, that the embassy had provided accurate information regarding the CAJE process. A review showed that 55 percent of the mission positions remained at the

same grade, 25 percent were upgraded, and only 20 percent of the mission positions were downgraded. Although the OIG team believes that the Embassy has taken reasonable measures to address CAJE issues, it appears that additional management-employee discussions may be required to dispel any lingering suspicion of the process.

Orientation, Awards, and Training

The HR section has minor operational procedures that need strengthening. There is no formal orientation for newly hired LE staff. The current mission check-in procedures include a review of the LE staff handbook and an explanation of the compensation plan but do not conform with 3 FAH-2 H-133.5B(1) guidance that states that new employees need accurate and complete information about the conditions of their employment and what is expected of them. The OIG team made an informal recommendation addressing this issue.

(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2) The mission can implement other types of recognition, such as the Employee of the Quarter, certificates of appreciation, and nonmonetary awards of minimal value for LE staff who do not qualify for Department awards. The OIG team made informal recommendations on these issues.

During the course of the inspection, the HR section issued a training policy in accordance with Department guidance and regulations. The OIG team applauds the embassy's effort to develop a training program that encompasses the needs and the professional development of employees mission-wide.

Other Locally Employed Staff Issues

Representatives from the LE staff associations in Abuja and Lagos met with the OIG team to discuss other concerns. They have also met with embassy and consulate general leadership including the Ambassador and the consul general. The OIG team encouraged both Abuja and Lagos LE staff associations to continue this dialogue with mission leadership.

(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)

The OIG team believes that the current mission housing allowance may be in accordance with the last Department’s analysis of the compensation survey; however, the medical allowance does not seem adequate and needs to be reviewed. HR supervisors are currently reviewing different options for LE staff medical insurance. One option is to offer medical insurance through a local contract. LE staff explained, however, that local medical insurance companies are not flexible and do not address their medical needs.

Recommendation 17: Embassy Abuja should solicit and analyze various options for medical allowances and submit the results to the Bureau of Human Resources for consideration. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with DGHR)

LE staff are also concerned about the pension plan and the viability of the Nigerian Government retirement system. Based on information developed as a result of the Nigerian Pension Reform Act in May 2004, the previous pension company used by the embassy appeared to be in financial trouble. As a result, in 2006, the embassy withdrew from that pension company and with the advice of the Office of Overseas Employment in the Bureau of Human Resources, the Embassy and the pension company made arrangements to pay employees all the money that had been invested prior to withdrawal. The pension company made only two of the 12 agreed installments payments, because further payments would have violated the Nigerian Pension Reform Act of 2004. Post management has held several meetings with LE staff to explain the status of the situation and to try to assuage their fears. The LE staff, however, does not have any confidence in Nigeria’s pension reforms, and they believe that this reform will fail and that they will lose their funds. Post management is currently reviewing the old pension agreement for submission to the Nigerian Pension Commission for approval to continue under the “existing scheme” rule. The OIG team informally recommended that Embassy Abuja distribute a monthly update about the pension issue to all LE staff employees.

Eligible Family Member Employment

EFM employment in Nigeria is a contentious issue. Several EFMs expressed dissatisfaction with the lengthy hiring process, the lack of HR responsiveness to their inquiries, and their inability to access HR forms electronically. In response, the OIG team reviewed a sample of both Abuja and Lagos EFM files. The OIG team found that in most cases, the EFM hiring and selection process took three months from application to employment. This timing is standard worldwide due largely to the security clearance processing conducted in the Department, which can take up to a year for dual national and foreign born spouses.

A file review revealed that there is little communication between the HR unit and the selected applicant during the security clearance process. If there were exchanges, they were not documented in the files. There is no hiring checklist for first-time EFMs to use as a guide. Not all the EFM files include an explanation of why an applicant had been selected. The OIG team made informal recommendations on these issues.

A number of EFMs in Abuja and Lagos alleged that the mission had not been proactive in creating EFM employment opportunities. At the time of the inspection, 10 vacant EFM positions had not been filled, four in Abuja and six in Lagos. The OIG team concluded that most EFMs are interested in part-time jobs and these vacant positions are full time. The OIG team informally recommended that Embassy Abuja work with hiring offices to create more job share positions.

Equal Employment Opportunity and Federal Women's Program

Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos have certified EEO counselors. They do not report any active cases. During the course of the inspection, the Federal Women's Program manager resigned. The OIG team made an informal recommendation that Embassy Abuja appoint a new Federal Women's Program manager.

EEO materials and the EEO contact information are posted on bulletin boards in the principal buildings. Because both the Embassy and the consulate have employees working in remote annexes, EEO information should be displayed on bulletin boards in other buildings as well. The OIG team made an informal recommendation on this issue.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

The financial management section effectively supports its ICASS subscribers. Under new leadership, the section is in transition and is working on increasing local-hire staffing to accommodate the explosive growth in mission staff. Since 2005, the ICASS workload counts show that vouchering increased 420 percent in Abuja and 275 percent in Lagos. The workload in other financial areas has also increased significantly. This strain has made it difficult for the staff to focus on cleaning up old transactions. Also, some of the section's management controls require strengthening. To its credit, the unit has done a good job of deobligating FY 2003-2006 prior year funds. Over \$1.5 million of ICASS funds are now available for FY 2008 programming needs. Procedural issues are discussed in the management controls section.

Nigeria is one of only two African missions with three financial management officers. Two financial management officers are resident in Abuja; the other resides in Lagos. At this time, there is sufficient work to keep all officers busy.

International Cooperative Administrative Support Services

Overall, ICASS is functioning adequately. The ICASS council meets regularly but is also able to convene quickly whenever needed. The mission provides administrative services to eight parent agencies, some with multiple subdivisions. Relationships among agencies are professional and productive. Duplicative administrative services will be consolidated upon the completion of the new office annex, and the identification of a new shared warehouse and maintenance shop.

The OIG team and Department surveys show that some administrative services receive below average scores when compared to worldwide scores. ICASS standards were revised in 2007, but the council has no system in place to monitor compliance with established standards or to address the areas where customer satisfaction falls below average. Monitoring is crucial to improving administrative services and customer relations. The OIG team informally suggested that the mission designate a quality monitor for each management section or hire a quality assurance monitor. The quality assurance monitor could be a local hire or EFM. The OIG team also suggested that the ICASS council form working groups to study the feasibility of outsourcing administrative services, increasing operational efficiency, and developing and initiating cost cutting measures. A working group could also be formed to consolidate duplicative administrative consolidation. These working groups would increase transparency. Mission personnel would better understand the internal and external obstacles the management staffs face.

The ICASS council is not involved in NSDD-38 requests. It is unaware of its role and responsibility in the NSDD-38 process. The ICASS council needs to be prepared for other agency staffing surges that may result from substantial program funding increases. The OIG team made informal recommendations to correct these deficiencies.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION SECURITY

Mission Nigeria's IM section is staffed by one information management officer (IMO), one information system officer (ISO), two information program officers (IPO), two IM specialists, eight telephone operators, four mailroom clerks, two radio technicians, four telephone technicians, and nine computer management specialists. Together they assist in the mission's daily operations of all communications that include classified and unclassified e-mail, classified and unclassified mail and pouch, and classified and unclassified telephones and radios. Additionally, they support the residential telephones and television (American Forces Network and satellite).

Nigeria's infrastructure leaves much to be desired. The telephone lines are deteriorating, power is unreliable, and the equipment that is available is of inferior quality. Network connections between the Embassy and consulate are aggravating for mission personnel but will hopefully be better by the end of March thanks to the energetic task-oriented ISO. However, Nigeria's IM staff understand that the following areas need improvement: training for the radio and telephone technicians, updated position descriptions for LE staff, the distribution of emergency action committee (EAC) network radios, an increased bandwidth for the consulate, and repair of the fire alarm in the information processing facility for the classified network.

Mission Nigeria's IM staff is professional, hardworking, competent, and enthusiastic. The staff in Abuja has a new building and new equipment. Fortunately for them there is little construction and overcrowding in their work space. Therefore, they do not suffer many of the problems of the staff at the consulate in Lagos. These include the constant cutting of telephone lines because of construction and traffic congestion that can mean the information technology staff and telephone technicians can take half a day getting to and from a remote site. These impediments reduce overall productivity. Further, the unreliable power has caused several of the remote sites to have problems with the servers, which the staff is in the process of resolving. The entire mission suffers from poor quality phone lines at the residences and most use their cellular phones to contact each other. Mission Nigeria is a challenging place for Americans as well as LE staff. The IM staff is doing well considering the daily obstacles they face.

The mission's radio and telephone technicians lack formal training. 5 FAM 121.2c(3)(d) requires that the IPO work with subordinates to develop individual development plans to ensure their training and development needs are met. It is a major failing that a radio technician and telephone technicians can work at the consulate for 21, 15, and 12 years respectively and never receive formal training. Because of global repositioning, the American telephone technician position was removed from the embassy and this leaves an LE staff telephone technician to manage a new and difficult telephone system. By all accounts this telephone system is not user-friendly and requires specialized training. The COB in Lagos has an obsolete telephone system for which spare parts are no longer available. Fortunately they will receive an upgrade this year by the Department's Foreign Post Telephone branch. Although, the Foreign Post Telephone branch will fund slots for training, the post must pay for per diem and travel. Because of years without training requests being submitted or being denied due to lack of funds when they are submitted, the LE staff is not optimistic about receiving training in the near future. Radios and telephones are critical communications for both posts. The motor pools in Lagos and Abuja use radios on a daily basis. They are critical for the emergency action plan, and many daily operations are performed using telephones. The failure of radios and telephones would have a significant impact on daily operations, and everybody would be inconvenienced.

Recommendation 18: Embassy Abuja should develop and implement training plans for the telephone and radio technicians within the mission. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

It is not clear if Mission Nigeria has host nation approval for radio frequencies used on the emergency and evacuation or EAC networks. As noted in 5 FAM 541c, customary international law requires host country consent before installing and using wireless transmitters. Although required by 5 FAH-2 H-712.2a, the embassy's information programs center (IPC) does not have the diplomatic note or any other records documenting permission to use frequencies in the country. The consulate's IPC, however, does have a document dated in 1966 giving consent for the embassy (because Lagos was the Embassy at the time) to use three frequencies. No one is sure if those are the same frequencies still being used today. If post does not address these frequencies they are in noncompliance with Department guidelines and the Vienna Conventions. The OIG team left an informal recommendation that the embassy contact the Nigerian Government to determine if the mission has proper approval and if not to obtain it.

Position descriptions for LE staff at both IPCs within the mission should be revised. As 5 FAM 121.2c(3)(c) states, the IPO is responsible for updating position descriptions of all IPC staff to include LE staff. The OIG team reviewed position descriptions for all IM staff within the mission and believes the position descriptions must better reflect duties. For example, the mailroom supervisors and clerks throughout the mission are responsible for prescreening common carrier and local mail to determine if it is suspicious and taking needed measures if the mail is suspicious. This exercise is important to the health and well-being of all personnel within the mission and requires a certain judgment, yet it is not reflected in the position description. IPC position descriptions should be accurate and reflect what an individual is responsible for so that there is no question what is required of them. The OIG team made an informal recommendation to update position descriptions of LE staff under the IPC mission wide.

Mission Nigeria's cellular phone policy needs to be updated and redistributed throughout the mission. The mission's cellular phone policy dated March 2006 does not accord with the provisions of 5 FAM 526.1 which lay out the minimum requirements of a post's cellular phone policy. Since this policy was created in 2006, many current personnel are not aware of it. For example, the consulate's radio technician was recently assigned the responsibility of distributing the cellular phones. He was unaware of the existence of the policy guidance, and therefore it was not distributed to personnel along with new cellular phones. All personnel within the mission should be aware of their responsibilities regarding the cellular phones and the policy should be in compliance with Department guidelines. The OIG team made an informal recommendation that post should update its cellular phone policy and redistribute it throughout the mission.

(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

Recommendation 19: (b) (2)(
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

Consulate Lagos' bandwidth is inadequate. As stated in 5 FAM 121.1b(7)(a), the IMO is responsible for effective, efficient, and secure information technology operations at post. Currently the consulate's primary circuit is running 448 kilobits which the Intranet, all applications, and Internet browsing use. This is very limited and does not allow for any extra communications such as digital videoconferencing between the consulate and the embassy which frequently disconnects during meetings. The ISO would like to upgrade the primary circuit to 768 kilobits which would cost \$85,248.00 annually. The backup circuit is a satellite connection which is 512 kilobits. The ISO would also like to upgrade it to the only fiber optic link (SAT 3) available in Nigeria. This will considerably increase the network speed. The cost of the backup circuit's upgrade is \$60,000 annually which would be funded by the Department's Virtual Private Networks program. The upgrade for the consulate's bandwidth will allow applications, Internet, and e-mail to work more efficiently and at a faster pace, thus increasing overall productivity.

Recommendation 20: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with Bureau of Information Resource Management, should upgrade the bandwidth for Consulate General Lagos. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with IRM)

(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

Recommendation 21: (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

Other agencies within the Embassy are not always receiving pertinent mission e-mails. All agencies in Abuja do not have access to the Department’s unclassified network; however, their agency e-mail addresses can be added to the network through a simple process using Microsoft Outlook. Unfortunately, the embassy offices that send out mission-wide security and other notices and the newsletter were not aware of this process; with the result that other agency personnel did not receive routine embassy notices. The IMO and offices with a need for mission-wide distribution of notices addressed this issue during the inspection.

Embassy Abuja has no ISO position. Per 5 FAM 121.1b(6)(d), the IMO has assumed the ISO responsibilities, and the operations have not suffered. This is mainly because the IMO is energetic and hardworking. According to embassy figures the Embassy has well over 100 American direct-hire personnel. Comparable posts of this size in other regions normally have an ISO position or an IPO and two IM specialist positions in which one would serve as an ISO. The Embassy’s staff has increased 50 percent since 2005, but the IM staff has not grown. If a less energetic IMO replaces the current IMO operations may suffer. An Engineering Services Security Report dated August 2007 recommended that the Embassy add a full-time ISO position. The IMO has been in contact with the Department on the subject but to no avail. The MSP just completed supports the need for this position, and the OIG team concurs in this assessment.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Living conditions in Nigeria are even tougher than the perception in Washington. Officers with no experience in developing countries often have a difficult adjustment. Nigeria is plagued with often violent crime. Because of security restrictions and fear, officers do not venture out of their “comfort zones” to take advantage of the limited recreational and cultural activities that are available. For some officers this means they never leave their homes in the evenings. Several officers said that they are just putting in their time and are waiting for their tours to end.

It used to be said that officers serving in African posts received good housing. In Nigeria, the opposite is true. Short-term leased properties are poorly constructed and require frequent repairs. In many cases, Government-owned properties have also been neglected. Personnel feel isolated in country, and travel to neighboring countries or to Europe is expensive, putting it out of range for lower salaried staff. Saving graces are the well-regarded international schools, active CLOs, efficient health units, and creative recreation associations. Employees generally praised all of these elements and gave them generally high scores on the pre-inspection surveys.

Community Liaison Office

After a series of staffing gaps, the CLOs in Abuja and Lagos are fully functioning, with enthusiastic and hard-working coordinators. Each office has two coordinators who divide up the 40-hour work week between them. Both embassy and consulate general personnel are relatively pleased with recreation activities and other programming, although customers expressed some concerns about both the sponsorship program for new employees in Abuja and the lack of programs for childless families and singles in Lagos. These concerns are not limited to Nigeria, however, and the OIG team made two informal recommendations to address these minor issues.

Schools

Quality schooling is one of the positive recruiting and morale factors for Mission Nigeria. Embassy and consulate general personnel and the Department’s Office of Overseas Schools praise the high quality of the educational programs offered by the schools in both Abuja and Lagos. Both schools have excellent facilities situated on expansive grounds, well-trained staff, a full complement of core and elective courses, plus a range of extracurricular activities.

The Embassy provides substantial assistance to the two schools, including oversight and guidance, financial grants, and logistical support, including the transport and customs clearance of academic materials and physical security upgrades. Both posts offer fee-based bus services with monitors and security escorts for what can be long and unpleasant commutes for mission children.

Health Unit

Health units in both Abuja and Lagos provide quality services to mission staff. The Abuja unit is spotless, confidential medical files are secured, and medicines are properly stored. However, staff does not keep disposal records of controlled medications. The OIG team made an informal recommendation on this issue.

The health unit in Lagos is headed by a regional medical officer (RMO). The RMO based in Lagos also provides regional medical support to other posts in the region. In his first tour with the Department, he has handled emergencies professionally and effectively. The RMO gets mixed reviews, however, on the OIG questionnaires. Some employees expressed dissatisfaction with the RMO's medical care and customer services skills. The OIG team counseled the RMO and provided him with suggestions on how to address these issues.

Visits from previous regional psychiatrists (RMO/P) have been inconsistent; the last visit was a year ago. Mission personnel would like periodic visits from the RMO/P. Given the stressful quality of life and uncertain security environment in Nigeria, the OIG team agrees that frequent RMO/P visits are needed. The OIG team informally recommended that the Embassy prepare a memorandum of understanding with the RMO/P based in Ghana to establish a schedule for regular consultation visits.

Avian Influenza Preparedness

Because it is one of only two African nations with a human fatality from avian influenza, Nigeria has been classified a priority country by the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza. The Nigerian Government is aware of the danger of avian influenza, and the Ministry of Health has developed a plan of action for use in the event of an outbreak.

Post management has been supportive of avian influenza preparedness efforts; there is an avian influenza working group that has responded to Department directives by developing a comprehensive plan with appropriate tripwires. The RMO has distributed appropriate material and educational information. Both health units are

well stocked with Tamiflu, a prescribed antiviral flu medicine. Two warden messages have been sent about avian influenza in the past year, although no American citizens have contacted the consular section with specific health concerns as of the date of the inspection.

American Employees Recreation Associations

The American Employees Recreation Association of Abuja has approximately 50 members and 11 employees. Its services include a school bus service, cafeteria, catering service, and a planned commissary.

From FY 2004 to FY 2006, the association sustained losses. In FY 2006, a new manager reviewed operations and developed a plan to eliminate losses. In FY 2007, the association had net earnings of \$43,393, demonstrating the plan's success. The manager appears to have staunched the losses and reenergized the organization, which has begun to show a profit.

The American Employees Recreation Association of Lagos is a separate and independent organization from the Abuja association. At one time, this association was one of the highest grossing associations with annual receipts totaling \$1,000,000. The association has 176 members and 37 employees. In 2002, the association began a decline that resulted in a two-year receivership. Reasons for this situation included: significant employee turnover, declining membership, and mismanagement. There were seven general managers in a five-year period. From FY 2005 to FY 2006, the association sustained losses of \$22,841, and \$21,651, respectively. In 2007, for the first time in years, the association realized a net income of \$10,112.

A new management team is trying to turn around the Lagos operations by reducing overhead, increasing revenue generating activities, and rebuilding membership. To be successful, the association will have to make adjustments until each of its core business activities is profitable. At this time, the hotel is the most profitable and is subsidizing the other business activities. The bar makes a modest profit. The restaurant and cafeteria operate at a loss. The OIG team believes that the Lagos association fills a very real need in a difficult environment and suggested ways to continue improving its financial viability.

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

The chief of mission's certification of management controls for Embassy Abuja dated July 7, 2007, reported one material weakness. Secure office space is insufficient for all U.S. Government employees in Abuja. The mission reported significant improvements in consular services, management controls, staffing, and political and economic reporting. The Lagos employee recreation association was taken out of trusteeship. An OIG review of the Department's financial compliance, performed by two independent auditors, discovered no material weaknesses. The OIG team concurs with the auditors' assessment, which suggested only minor procedural improvements. Additional work is needed to comply with some financial management procedures.

Outstanding Travel Advances

Embassy Abuja is not following Department procedures (4 FAH-3 H-460) for processing travel vouchers and travel advances. The open advance financial report shows 276 travel advances totaling about \$239,000. Of this amount, there are 100 travel advances totaling about \$41,000 that have been outstanding for more than one year. In addition, some travelers have been issued new travel advances before settling prior outstanding travel advances. To clear open travel advances in a timely manner, travelers are required to submit their travel voucher within five days of completing authorized travel. Regulations say that prior travel advances to a traveler must be repaid before the traveler departs on transfer, separation, home leave, or further temporary duty travel. Because a travel advance is a loan, if it is not promptly vouchered or refunded, it represents a debt to the U.S. Government. Outstanding travel advances greater than 30 calendar days are subject to the Debt Collection Act, which provides for interest, administrative charges, and penalties. Embassy Abuja has taken some steps toward enforcing Department travel regulations; however, additional monitoring, enforcement, and research are needed to clear outstanding travel advances and prevent new incidents.

Recommendation 22: Embassy Abuja should establish and implement procedures that require travelers to submit their travel vouchers within the time frames established in the Financial Management Procedures Handbook. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 23: Embassy Abuja should research and resolve all outstanding travel advances that have been pending more than 30 days. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Suspense Account

Transactions totaling about \$443,000 have been placed in the suspense deposits abroad account. Some transactions date back to FY 2003-06. The majority of the high-dollar transactions are from proceeds of sales, refunds of outstanding travel advances, medical reimbursements, and pension contributions. 4 FAH-3 H-322.2-6 states that the balance in the suspense account must be reviewed quarterly to determine if there are unclaimed balances that should be refunded to the depositor. For the proceeds of sale items, the financial management section is waiting for the general services office to identify appropriation accounts originally charged for each sale item so that these proceeds can be charged to the correct appropriation accounts (4 FAH-3 H 321.3). These procedures should be followed routinely.

Recommendation 24: Embassy Abuja should establish and implement procedures that require quarterly review of the suspense account and the allocation of suspense account items to the depositor or to the correct account. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 25: Embassy Abuja should research and reconcile all transactions charged to the suspense account that have been outstanding for more than 90 days. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Subcashier Verifications

Embassy Abuja is not always following Department procedures (4 FAH-3 H-397.2-3) for the verification of subcashier advances. The regulations require an unannounced verification of the subcashier funds at least monthly for an advance amount equivalent to \$1,000 or more and quarterly for an advance amount less than \$1,000. There was no evidence that this procedure was being followed regularly. The OIG team made an informal recommendation to correct this situation, and the

financial management section stated that they would start to follow this procedure immediately. To train subcashiers, the financial management section developed a useful in-house training computer disk.

Consulate General Residence Renovations

End of year FY 2007 program funds totaling about \$220,000 were used to fund maintenance and renovation projects at the consul general's residence in Lagos. Program funds were used to purchase two generators totaling \$107,000. The remaining funding was used for the replacement of wood floors, carpeting, and plumbing. These items should have been charged as OBO special projects using OBO allotments. The OIG team counseled the mission on the appropriate use of program funds.

Grants Management

The mission manages and administers its grants program in accordance with Department guidelines. Embassy Abuja manages the majority of the low-dollar and single-year public diplomacy and self-help grants. USAID, DOD, and CDC are the implementing agencies for large multi-million, multiyear grant programs such as PEPFAR. Interagency coordination is effective. Mission personnel are providing adequate monitoring and conducting site visits.

One area to improve is training. Some grants officer representatives and program managers do not receive any type of formal grants management training. Trained officers help by offering guidance and assistance to their untrained colleagues. Other officers learn how to manage grants by doing the work. As the mission receives additional funding for grant programs, it is important that the officers managing these programs have the required training, now available at the Foreign Service Institute, before arriving at post or early in their tours.

FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Embassy Abuja should follow National Security Decision Directive-38 guidelines to perform and document a comprehensive analysis of both programmatic and administrative requirements, including administrative support, security, office and residential space, and training cost issues prior to deciding on requests to increase personnel. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Abuja, should amend the design of the chancery annex to accommodate the staff growth that has occurred since the current design was approved. (OBO, in coordination with Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 3: Embassy Abuja should identify a suitable facility that can accommodate both a warehouse and maintenance shop, using the services of both a local real estate broker and a Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations real estate specialist, and vacate the existing facility as a matter of urgency. (Embassy Abuja, in coordination with OBO)

Recommendation 4: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources and the Bureau of African Affairs, should rewrite the job description for position #20017002 and seek its re-grading at the FS-02 level. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with DGHR)

Recommendation 5: Embassy Abuja should rewrite the work requirements of the information resource officer in Abuja (#60104000) to indicate that he makes regular visits to the public affairs section in Lagos to review its Information Resource Center operations and provide continuing program and technical advice and consultations. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 6: Embassy Abuja should request Consulate General Lagos to return the Abuja fraud investigation cases still awaiting action and develop a six-month training plan that will enable Embassy Abuja to conduct fraud investigations on Consulate General Lagos' behalf in its consular district. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 7: Embassy Abuja should instruct Consulate General Lagos to develop both a fraud prevention unit travel plan that includes officers in some of the field investigations and a mechanism for spot checking other investigation results, and Embassy Abuja should follow suit. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 8: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should rewrite the position description of the Lagos deputy consular section chief to include primary responsibility for the American citizens services unit. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with CA)

Recommendation 9: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of African Affairs, should eliminate one of the three consular associate positions at Consulate General Lagos and replace it with an additional consular assistant position, adjusting the funding source as appropriate. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with CA and AF)

Recommendation 10: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Abuja and the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should amend the design of the Consulate General Lagos reconstruction project to include a second teller window and deal tray in the consular cashier's booth accessible from the public affairs section stairwell. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Abuja and CA)

Recommendation 11: Embassy Abuja should consult with Consulate General Lagos and the Bureau of Consular Affairs about requirements and fund a Q-matic system that can be installed at the same time as the reconstruction project or, if funds are not available, prepare a request to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations for procurement and funding as part of the renovation project. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 12: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations should conduct an analysis to determine if it makes economic sense to build additional Government-owned residential units in Nigeria. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 13: Embassy Abuja should prepare and forward to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations a mission-wide maintenance plan with financial justification for a funding increase in the 7901 and 7902 accounts. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 14: Embassy Abuja should develop and implement appliance and furniture pools in order to minimize the need for warehouse space, as well as to achieve greater efficiency in managing inventories of nonexpendable U.S. Government property. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 15: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, should develop a timetable and list of resource requirements to implement all recommendations for Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos warehouses from the 2007 visit of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations safety, health, and environmental specialist. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with OBO)

Recommendation 16: Embassy Abuja should conduct a mission-wide review of all position descriptions, revise those that are not accurate, and reclassify the affected positions under the computer assisted job evaluation process. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 17: Embassy Abuja should solicit and analyze various options for medical allowances and submit the results to the Bureau of Human Resources for consideration. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with DGHR)

Recommendation 18: Embassy Abuja should develop and implement training plans for the telephone and radio technicians within the mission. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 19: (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

Recommendation 20: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with Bureau of Information Resource Management, should upgrade the bandwidth for Consulate General Lagos. (Action: Embassy Abuja, in coordination with IRM)

Recommendation 21: (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

Recommendation 22: Embassy Abuja should establish and implement procedures that require travelers to submit their travel vouchers within the time frames established in the Financial Management Procedures Handbook. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 23: Embassy Abuja should research and resolve all outstanding travel advances that have been pending more than 30 days. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 24: Embassy Abuja should establish and implement procedures that require quarterly review of the suspense account and the allocation of suspense account items to the depositor or to the correct account. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

Recommendation 25: Embassy Abuja should research and reconcile all transactions charged to the suspense account that have been outstanding for more than 90 days. (Action: Embassy Abuja)

INFORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Informal recommendations cover matters not requiring action by organizations outside of the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau and are not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or onsite compliance review will assess the mission's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

Public Diplomacy

Mission Nigeria's American Corners vary widely in the quality of partnership they can offer to PAS and other mission agencies. They have been poorly funded since they were established. A moratorium on adding corners to the program in the near and medium term, would allow PAS to develop models promoting greater consistency among the present American Corners.

Informal Recommendation 1: Embassy Abuja should follow a near-term to medium-term strategy of maintaining the present number of American Corners and strengthening their partnership capacity.

Consular Affairs

Consulate General Lagos' FPU has several fraud investigators, a fraud analyst, a data-entry clerk, and a secretary/clerk. Embassy Abuja is just hiring its first fraud investigator. Lagos will begin forwarding all fraud cases requiring investigation in the north to Abuja.

Informal Recommendation 2: Embassy Abuja should review the fraud prevention units' caseload distribution a year after Abuja assumes full responsibility for investigations in its consular district to determine if a Lagos investigator position should be transferred to Abuja.

The IV unit in Lagos refers all adoption cases to the FPU for investigation, yet most of the cases do not reveal fraud but instead uncover instances of incomplete processing according to the legal requirements of the Nigerian state in which the adoption is occurring.

Informal Recommendation 3: Embassy Abuja should request the Lagos fraud analyst, in conjunction with the immigrant visa chief, to review pending adoption cases, track and analyze results, and reevaluate the practice of referring all such cases for field investigation.

The warden system in Nigeria is dysfunctional, having suffered neglect for some time. Many e-mail alerts to registrants are returned undeliverable. Some wardens have left the country, and others have not received updated registrant lists or training for years.

Informal Recommendation 4: Embassy Abuja should include the reconstituting of a functioning warden system in its Mission Strategic Plan and devote more of its representational and outreach efforts towards this goal.

Procurement

Some employees do not consistently enter pertinent information into the WebPASS, negating the systems advantages.

Informal Recommendation 5: Embassy Abuja should provide WebPASS training to mission personnel.

Embassy Abuja does not have a comprehensive procurement plan that includes a year-end spending plan.

Informal Recommendation 6: Embassy Abuja should develop a comprehensive procurement plan.

Some employees complain that procurements take too long.

Informal Recommendation 7: Embassy Abuja should issue an administrative notice reminding staff about the length of time and staff requirements involved in unclassified and secure procurements.

When there are delays in processing procurement requests, the procurement section is not letting customers know when goods and services will arrive.

Informal Recommendation 8: Embassy Abuja should provide customer service training to the procurement staff.

The procurement unit frequently receives incomplete procurement requests.

Informal Recommendation 9: Embassy Abuja should redesign its procurement request form highlighting required fields of information.

The procurement section does not monitor its compliance with ICASS standards.

Informal Recommendation 10: Embassy Abuja should expand the procurement section's duties to include compliance with International Cooperative Administrative Support Services standards.

There are inefficiencies in the interaction between procurement and other management units. For example, obtaining funding for goods and services has caused some delays.

Informal Recommendation 11: Embassy Abuja should develop procedures in coordination with other management section in order to facilitate quicker procurements for goods and services.

Motor Pool Operations

The Ambassador's and DCM's drivers are working excessive overtime. This is a safety hazard.

Informal Recommendation 12: Embassy Abuja should assign additional drivers to the Ambassador and deputy chief of mission and keep overtime for drivers to acceptable levels prescribed in Department motor vehicle and safety guidelines.

Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos want to change the vehicle fleet to just Toyota vehicles.

Informal Recommendation 13: Embassy Abuja should prepare proper waivers and obtain justifications before proceeding with changing the vehicle fleet.

Abuja and Lagos have large numbers of vehicles ready for disposal.

Informal Recommendation 14: Embassy Abuja should develop and implement a plan with a timeline for the disposal of official vehicles.

Human Resources

Mission job vacancy announcements are advertised only on the Embassy and consulate Intranet and Internet Web sites. Other agencies advertised their job vacancies for highly skilled positions in several newspapers.

Informal Recommendation 15: Embassy Abuja should advertise in places other than just the Embassy and the consulate intranet and Internet.

Neither Embassy Abuja nor Consulate General Lagos has a regular orientation program for their newly hired local staff employees.

Informal Recommendation 16: Embassy Abuja should establish and implement a mission-wide orientation program for all their newly hired locally employed staff employees.

Some American supervisors rarely submit award nominations for their sections.

Informal Recommendation 17: Embassy Abuja should encourage supervisors to submit award nominations and assist them in writing them if they so request it.

Mission American supervisors do not take advantage of other types of recognition, such as local staff Employee of the Quarter, certificate of appreciations, and non-monetary award of minimal value (i.e., a logo coffee mug).

Informal Recommendation 18: Embassy Abuja should establish and encourage managers to fill out other types of recognitions for local staff employees.

Embassy Abuja does not have a human resources checklist with timelines about the hiring process for EFMs.

Informal Recommendation 19: Embassy Abuja should prepare a checklist with timelines about the hiring process for eligible family members.

An explanation from the post employment committee on the selection of an EFM is not always included in the files.

Informal Recommendation 20: Embassy Abuja should request from the post employment committee and keep in the files an explanation of the selection of an eligible family member.

Equal Employment Opportunity

During the course of the inspection, the Federal Women's Program manager resigned from the position.

Informal Recommendation 21: Embassy Abuja should name a Federal Women's Program manager.

In the Embassy, the Department's EEO materials and EEO contact is posted in the HR bulletin board and on Intranet. In Consulate General Lagos, general information about EEO laws and policies are displayed on a bulletin board in the general services section.

Informal Recommendation 22: Embassy Abuja should place Equal Employment Opportunity information on bulletin boards of all buildings.

International Cooperative Administrative Support Services

Although the Embassy established its ICASS service performance standards, these are not integrated as part of daily management operations, nor are they monitored on a regular basis or included in local staff performance evaluations. Some units of the management section were not aware of the established service performance standards.

Informal Recommendation 23: Embassy Abuja should monitor compliance with International Cooperative Administrative Support Services standards and use the results as a management tool to improve customer service.

Informal Recommendation 24: Embassy Abuja should include compliance with International Cooperative Administrative Support Services standards as an element in performance evaluations.

The ICASS council does not understand its role and responsibility for advising the Chief of Mission on cost implications of NSDD-38 requests and making recommendations on ICASS staffing levels per Department's guidance, Action Request and Guidance for Chief of Mission NSDD-38 Requests.

Informal Recommendation 25: Embassy Abuja should distribute National Security Decision Directive-38 guidance and train International Cooperative Administrative Support Services Council members on developing cost impacts for National Security Decision Directive-38 requests.

Financial Management

Embassy Abuja is not always following departmental procedures for maintaining and monitoring post accounts (4 FAM 087). Reviews of financial records show that the

Embassy needs to pay closer attention to monitoring status of funds and status of obligation reports. There are still sums from past fiscal years that remain obligated without any clear explanation.

Informal Recommendation 26: Embassy Abuja should establish procedures that include periodic monitoring of status of funds, obligations, and liquidation amounts.

The financial management office does not regularly consult with the general services office to determine if unliquidated obligations are still valid.

Informal Recommendation 27: Embassy Abuja should require the financial management and general services offices to schedule monthly meetings to determine the validity of unliquidated obligations.

In some instances, program offices do not do not always receive timely updates on budgets from the financial management office in order to plan programs and expenditures.

Informal Recommendation 28: Embassy Abuja should develop procedures to make certain that the financial management office provides program offices with the status of fund reports

In some instances, unannounced verification of the subcashier funds are not being conducted at least monthly when the advance amount is U.S. dollar equivalent 1,000 or more and quarterly if the amount is less than U.S. dollar equivalent 1,000 as required by 4 FAH-3 H-397.2-3.

Informal Recommendation 29: Embassy Abuja should conduct verifications of cash advances to subcashiers.

According to 4 FAM 033.1-3 a. and 4 FAH-3 H-397.1-2, cash verifications should be conducted in an unpredictable pattern. Embassy Abuja and Consulate General Lagos are conducting cash verifications in a predictable pattern, usually at the end of each month.

Informal Recommendation 30: Embassy Abuja should conduct cash verifications using an unpredictable pattern at varying times of the month.

Information Management and Information Security

It is not clear if Mission Nigeria has the Nigerian Government's approval for radio frequencies used on the emergency and evacuation or EAC networks. 5 FAM 541c states that customary international law requires host country consent before installing and using wireless transmitters.

Informal Recommendation 31: Embassy Abuja should determine if the mission has current Nigerian Government approval to operate radio frequencies for the emergency and evacuation and emergency action committee networks. If they do not, they should obtain approval to operate the radio frequencies for the appropriate radio networks.

Position descriptions for LE staff at both information program centers within the mission should be revised. 5 FAM 121.2c(3)(c) requires that the IPO be responsible for updating position descriptions of all IPC staff to include LE staff.

Informal Recommendation 32: Embassy Abuja should update all position descriptions of locally employed staff under the information program center throughout the mission.

Mission Nigeria's cellular phone policy needs to be updated and redistributed throughout the mission. The mission's cellular phone policy dated March 2006 lacks the requirements of 5 FAM 526.1 which lay out the minimum requirements of a post's cellular phone policy.

Informal Recommendation 33: Embassy Abuja should update the mission's cellular phone policy to reflect the requirements of Department regulations and redistribute it throughout the mission.

Community Liaison Office

Embassy personnel complained that their sponsors did not perform their duties.

Informal Recommendation 34: Embassy Abuja should develop a checklist of sponsor duties and responsibilities and monitor that duties are completed.

Single adults and couples without children in Consulate General Lagos told the OIG team they would appreciate CLO programs directed to their interests.

Informal Recommendation 35: Embassy Abuja should establish an advisory board in Lagos with officers who are single or childless to provide events ideas that appeal to them.

Health Unit

Neither Embassy Abuja nor Consulate General Lagos health unit keeps disposal records of controlled medication.

Informal Recommendation 36: Embassy Abuja should maintain in a file the disposal records of controlled medication.

Visits from previous RMO/Pd have been inconsistent; the last visit one was a year ago.

Informal Recommendation 37: Embassy Abuja should prepare a memorandum of understanding with the regional psychiatrist based in Ghana to establish a schedule for recurrent consultations visits.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

	Name	Arrival Date
Abuja		
Ambassador	Robin R. Sanders	12/07
Deputy Chief of Mission	Lisa Piascik	09/07
Chiefs of Sections:		
Management	David Yeutter	10/07
Consular	Victoria Coffineau	07/06
Political	Walter Pflaumer	08/07
Economic	Robert R. Tansey	09/07
Public Affairs	Atim George	08/06
Regional Security	Paul Brown	8/06
Lagos		
Consul General	Donna M. Blair	12/07
Chiefs of Sections:		
Management	Vicki Hutchinson	08/07
Consular	Debra Heien	02/07
Political/economic	Helen Hudson	08/06
Public Affairs	Tim Gerhardson	07/06
Regional Security	Robert Myers	07/06
Other Agencies:		
Department of Defense		
Defense Attaché Office	COL Peter Aubrey	07/06
HIV-Walter Reed Program	LT. Cdr. Darrell Singer	01/07
Office of Def. Cooperation	LTC Luis Perozo	08/06

~~**SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED**~~

Drug Enforcement Administration	Sam Gaye (resident in Lagos)	06/05
Foreign Agricultural Service	Ali Abdi (resident in Lagos)	08/05
Foreign Commercial Service	Robert Farris (resident in Lagos)	07/07
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Ronald Nolan (resident in Lagos)	10/06
Health and Human Services		
Centers for Disease Control	John Vertefeuille	10/05
National Institutes of Health	Katherine Perry	01/05
Department of Treasury	John (Jack) Delaney	06/05
U.S. Agency for International Development	Sharon Cromer	08/07

ABBREVIATIONS

ACS	American citizens services
CA	Bureau of Consular Affairs
CAJE	Computer Assisted Job Evaluation
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CLO	community liaison office
COB	consulate office building
CPAO	country public affairs officer
DCM	deputy chief of mission
Department	Department of State
DOD	Department of Defense
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
EAC	emergency action committee
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
EFM	eligible family member
ELO	entry-level officer
ESTH	environment, science, technology, and health
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FPU	fraud prevention unit
G/TIP	Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons
HR	human resources
ICASS	International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
IM	information management
IMO	information management officer
IPC	information programs center
IPO	information program officer

INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
IRC	information resource center
IRO	information resource officer
ISO	information systems officer
IV	immigrant visa
LE	locally employed (staff)
MEB	Mechanical Engineering Branch
MSP	Mission Strategic Plan
MIST	Military Information Support Team
NEC	new embassy compound
NIV	nonimmigrant visa
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
OBO	Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
OIG	Office of Inspector General
PAO	public affairs officer
PAS	public affairs section
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief
RMO	regional medical officer
RMO/P	regional medical officer/psychiatrist
RSO	regional security officer
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

FRAUD, WASTE, ABUSE OR MISMANAGEMENT
of Federal programs
and resources hurts everyone.

Call the Office of Inspector General
HOTLINE
202/647-3320
or **1-800-409-9926**
or e-mail oighotline@state.gov
to report illegal or wasteful activities.

You may also write to
Office of Inspector General
U.S. Department of State
Post Office Box 9778
Arlington, VA 22219
Please visit our website at oig.state.gov

Cables to the Inspector General
should be slugged "OIG Channel"
to ensure confidentiality.